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February 21, 1986 Conference <polo
List 1, Sheet 4
No. 85-1033-CFX
KELLEY (Ct. State's
Attorney)

,J1,

(Sf-a.-- V

~ -)

v.

ROBINSON (bankrupt
offender) _.----...

1.

SUMMARY:

Petr

(really the State of Connecticut)

challenges the CA2's holding that an obligation to make restitu-

--------

-----~

tion following a criminal conviction is a debt dischargeable in
bankruptcy.
~)

__.....,

2.

0 124/V I

~

-

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

IS#-

L

{,_

::I-

Resp was convicted of

~--------A;t1 ;() 0 T 1}-T /l!. L If

.s

S ~ dv?~ ~c:.c~~.,..,_/ ~t/'11. ~

-

2 -

second-degree larceny for simultaneously receiving public assistance from the Connecicut Department of Income Maintenance (CDIM)
and Social Security.

On Nov. 14, 1980, she was sentenced to one-

to-three years imprisonment, but the sentence was suspended and

-------

she was placed on probation for 5 years.

One of the conditions
~-----------------

-

of her probation was that she make restitution of the $9932 she
.....

had stolen at the rate of $100 per month.
ing the payments on Jan. 16, 1981.
tion,

she would

repay $5800.

She was to start mak-

Over the course of her proba-

On Feb.

5,

1981,

however,

resp

filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut.
creditors,
Conn.

resp listed CDIM as having a claim of $6000 and the

Office
The

$9932.

On her schedule of

of Adult
bankruptcy

Probation

(COAP)

court n otified

as

having

a

both

CDIM

and

S.f~~f..£.... "1

claim of
COAP

of

resp's petition, but neither filed any form of objection by the
t\

deadline.

Eventually, in May 1981, the bankruptcy court issued

~

an order discharging

resp from all dischargeable debts.

After

receiv1ng this discharge, resp notified COAP of her intention to
discontinue making restitution;

she then stopped her payments.

\ CDIM and COAP did nothing until February 1984, when COAP wrote
\ resp a letter requesting her to resume payment.
Resp then filed the instant adversary proceeding in the
bankruptcy court seeking a declaration that her obligation to
make

restitution payments had been discharged by the May 1981

order.

The bankruptcy court (Shiff), in an order adopted by the

district court

(Daly),

rejected resp's position.

It relied on

its opinion in a similar case, In re Pellegrino (see App. to Pet.

- 3 -

for Cert.

7a-26a).

In Pellegrino,

restitution obligation

is

not

a

the court had found that a

"debt"

within the meaning of

§ 101 ( 11) of the Bankruptcy Code, since the victim of a defendant's crime had no right to payment.

The court also relied on

the Younger doctrine's expression of federal reluctance to interfere

in

ongoing

state

criminal proceedings,

finding

that

the

restitution obligation was part of such ongoing proceedings, and
on a statement in the legislative history of the 1978 Code stating that the bankruptcy laws "are not a haven for criminal offenders

••.. "

That a state agency was the victim of a defend-

ant's crime did not alter the analysis.

Since no "debt" existed,

no discharge of such a debt in bankruptcy was possible.

Pelle-

grino also held that, even if the obligation to make restitution
were a debt, the exception in the automatic stay provision for
the continuation of criminal proceedings, §362(b) (1), compelled
the conclusion that neither the restitution order nor the wage
execution by which it was carried out could be stayed.

Finally,

Pellegrino held that §523(a) (7), which provides that a discharge
does not relieve a debtor of any debt that is "a fine, penalty,
or forfeiture payable to and for
unit, and rthat]
applied.

the benefit of a governmental

is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss,"

Under Conn. law, restitution is imposed to rehabilitate

the offender

rather

than to compensate the victim.

Thus,

the

restitution obligation is punitive in nature.
The CA2 reversed.

First, it held that the restitution

obligation was a "debt" within the meaning of §101 (11).
is defined as

"1 iabi 1 i ty on a claim,"

and

"claim"

"Debt"

is broadly

- 4 defined

in

§101(4).

The

CA2

recognized

that

the

majority of

i'

courts that had considered the question had excluded restitution
obligations from the definition of debts,
their

reasoning.

but it disagreed with

Congress sought the broadest possible defini-

tion of "claim" to bring all legal obligations of the debtor into
the bankruptcy proceeding.
(1985).
be
not

The CA2 found

"anomalous"
claims

since

would

See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs,

the approach of the other courts to

f inding

preclude

u.s.

that

holders

restitution obligations were
of

the

right

to

restitution

from participating in the bankruptcy proceedings or receiving any
distribution from the estate's liquidation.

Under the 1898 Act,

however, holders of rights to restitution were permitted to participate.
the

The CA2 also refused to make any distinction based on

provenance

claim whether

of

right

it was

criminal judgment.
posite.

a

to

restitution--such

a

right

was

a

based on civil equitable proceedings or a

The CA2 found the other CA cases cited inap-

The CA3 and CAll cases, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a,

had concerned debtors who were in the midst of criminal proceedings and had not yet been ordered to make restitution;

all the

CA's had done there was refuse to enjoin the state criminal proceedings.

The CAS and CA7 cases held that a district court could

impose a restitution obligation as part of a criminal conviction
involving a debt that had been discharged . in bankruptcy.
Nor was the CA2 persuaded by the argument that Congress
did

not

intend

to

permit

discharge

of

restitution

obligations

because it did not want to provide a "haven for criminal offenders."

That language was taken out of context by the courts that

- 5 -

had relied on it;
§362.
the

it concerned the automatic stay provisions of

The fact that Congress exempted fines and penalties from
discharge

provision

of

§727

shows

that

such

fines

are

"claims" since otherwise no need for excepting them would exist.
Congress engaged

in a complex and careful line drawing process

regarding the protections criminals were entitled to claim under
the Code.
The CA2 then turned to the question whether the restitution obligation was dischargeable.
al

categories

of

debts

from

Section 523 excludes sever-

the discharge provisions of

Three of those categories--subsection
incurred
dealing
fines

through
with

fraud

debts

provision

or

false

incur red

discussed

(a) (2), dealing with debts

statements;

through

S727.

subsection

larceny;

above--seemed

and

(a) (4),

(a) ( 7) ,

potentially

the

relevant.

But §523(c) discharged debts falling within the categories established by subsections (a) (2) and (a) (4) unless the creditor files
a

timely object ion.

Thus,

although the CA2

"suspect [ ed] "

that

the bankruptcy court would have refused to discharge the obligation here because it was for larceny, COAP and CDIM had failed to
object.
The CA2 found
tion,

(a) (7) , which does not require an objec-

to be inapplicable because the restitution was "compensa-

tion for

actual pecuniary loss."

The amount resp had been or-

dered to pay was exactly equal to the amount she had wrongfully
received from CDIM.

That other parts of Conn.'s probation scheme

are not compensatory does not alter the compensatory character of
the restitution condition.

And nothing in the legislative histo-

-

6 -

ry of §S27(a) (7) suggests that a fine must be exclusively compensatory to be excluded.
Judge
wrote

Mansfield

joined

separately to express

the

majority's

opinion,

but

"concern at the unfortunate result

compelled by the language of the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code" and his hope that Congress would close the loophole
that permitted criminals to avoid their restitution obligations
by going into bankruptcy.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr claims

created a conflict among the circuits.
prior discharge

the CA2' s

decision has

The CAS has held that the

in bankruptcy of a debt created by the defend-

ant's bank fraud did not preclude the district court from imposing an obligation to make rest.itution as one of the conditions
for a suspended sentence.
(CAS 1982);
1980)

United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216

see United States v.

(similar case).

Alexander,

743 F.2d

472

(CA7

The CA3, CAS, and CAll have all held that

bankruptcy courts cannot enjoin state criminal proceedings that
may result in orders requiring defendants to make restitution in
connection with

discharged

or

dischargeable

debts.

See

In

re

Davis, 691 F.2d 176 (CA3 1982); McDonald v. Burrows, 731 F.2d 294
(CAS),
673

cert.

F.2d

denied,

12SO

(CAll

U.S.
1982).

The

(1984);
CA2's

Barnette v.

attempt

Evans,

to distinguish

these cases is unavailing because, at least in McDonald and Barnett, the state court might have imposed a restitution obligation
before

the end of

the

bankruptcy proceeding

obligation might have been dischargeable.

in which case the

Moreover, each of the

other CA opinions rested, not on the temporal sequence of imposi-

- 7 -

tion of restitution and bankruptcy proceedings, but on the belief
that Congress did not intend to allow the discharge of criminal
restitution.

And, as the CA2 recognized, virtually every federal

bankruptcy court to consider the question took a contrary view to
that adopted by the CA2.
~he

CA2's approach misunderstands the nature of a res-

titution obligation.

The obligation bears virtually no resem-

blance to an ordinary debt, since it is actually paid to an intermediary like COAP rather
money.

Moreover,

than the party which

is owed the

its central character is punitive.

And Con-

gress' desire not to let criminals use the Bankruptcy Code as a
haven

is relevant:

it would make no sense to allow States to

continue criminal proceedings and simultaneously tell them that
their punitive sanctions could be nullified by a discharge order.
Petr echoes the bankruptcy court's argument about Younger.
Finally, that neither CDIM nor COAP filed an objection
should not affect their rights.

Forcing States to enter bank-

ruptcy proceedings to defend criminal judgments would drain their
resources.

Moreover,

it

would

not close

the

loophole,

since

restitution obligations awarded in cases not involving fraud or
larceny would still suffer the same difficulties.
Kovacs does not require a different result.

A State's

ability to enforce a civil injunction is · less important than its
compelling interest in protecting the community from crime.

Ko-

vacs recognized §523(a)(7)'s force.
Resp replies that the major point made by the CA2 is
that CDIM and COAP' s

failure

to object, after not ice, was the

- 8 reason

the

restitution

obligation

waived their §523(c) rights.
points made by the CA2 1 s

was

discharged,

since

they

For the most part, resp repeats the

opinion regarding the construction of

the words "debt" and "claim" and its interpretation of the scope
of §523(a) (7).

Resp also distinguishes Carson, Alexander, Davis,

Barnette, McDonald, on the same grounds relied on by the CA2.
Twenty-six States have filed an amicus brief supporting
petr.

In addition to raising the points pressed in petr 1 s brief,

amici

observe

that

the

CA2 1 s

decision may

have

the

effect

of

forcing States to use less effective or desirable sanctions, such
as imprisonment, because restitution obligations will be uneforceable.

That

restitution,

like

imprisonment,

can be viewed as

paying a "debt to society" does not transform it into an obligation dischargeable in bankruptcy.
deterrence,

punishment,

tice--distinguish

it

The purposes of restitution--

rehabilitation,

from

the

type

of

and

proportional

jus-

compensatory civil

fine

excluded from §523 (a) (7).
4.

DISCUSSION:

The

CA2 1 s

summary

holdings of all but one of the eight bankruptc
the

issue

615-616
this

is accurate.

(Bankr.

simply

a

D.

Colo.

conflict

See, e.g.,
1983)

of

the

contrary

courts to address

In re Johnson,

32 B.R.

(also summarizing cases).

between the CA2

and

various

614,
Were

bankruptcy

courts, it might make sense to wait for the views of other circuits.

But, although the opinions by the CA3, CAS, CA7, and CAll

discussed above do not present a square confl'ct, they do reflect
an approach to the relationship between state crimina! law and
the Code that seems

in

fundamental

tens ion with the CA2 1 s per-

- 9 -

spective.
The Court's impending decision in Nos. 84-801 and 84805, Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental

Protection

and

O'Neill

v.

City of

New

York,

supports

petr's claim, since the Court seems inclined to read the Code to
avoid conflict with the States' exercise of their police powers.
The CA2' s

decision here provides an easy way of circumventing

state criminal law; moreover, to the extent that restitution is
an effective, inexpensive criminal sanction, the disincentive to
its use provided by the CA2 will raise the costs of criminal law
enforcement borne by the States.
Moreover, I think the CA2 mischaracterizes the restitution obligation.

Petr and amici seem right when they argue that,

as a matter of state law, restitution is meant as part of the
punishment

scheme /.

Had

~

resp,

Connecticut
3

imposed

a

$9932

fine

on

it's clear, under §52'f(a) (7), that the fine would not be

dischargeable in bankruptcy, even if the fine were to be paid in
installments.

I do not see why Connecticut's decision to remit

money paid in criminal fines to the injured party transforms the
nature of the fine.
I

see a

final reason for granting here.

Although I

think the CA2's bottom line is incorrect, the bankruptcy courts
which have taken what I believe to be th'e correct approach have
split as

to whether

a

restitution obligation is not a claim,

e.g., Pellegrino, or is a claim, but simply not a dischargeable
one, e.g., Johnson.
whether

States

owed

This distinction may make some difference in
restitution

payments

must

participate

in

- 10 bankruptcy proceedings to

p~t

their rights under §523(a) (2) and

(a) (4).

One thing might counsel against a grant here:
found

that,

the CA2

had CDIM and COAP objected, §523 (a) (4) would likely

have precluded resp's receiving a discharge.

If the CA2 intends

to read the larceny and fraud exceptions broadly, the split between

its

approach

and

approaches

taken

other

this

require

will

by

the

more

straightforward

courts may have

the States

no-discharge

little effect.

to participate

in

the

But

bankruptcy

proceedings to protect their judgments of criminal conviction, a
perhaps undesirable effect.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I tentatively recommend a grant.

There is a response and an amicus brief.
January 17, 1986
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No. 85-1033, Kelly, Connecticut Chief State's Attorney, et al. v.
Robinson (CA 2)
Memorandum for File
The question presented in the petition for cert quite simply
is whether "a criminal restitution order is dischargable as a
debt in bankruptcy?"

In its brief, the state frames a question

favorably to itself substantially· as follows:

"Whether a bank-

ruptcy court has any authority to nullify a valid final judgment
of a state criminal court, and thus allow a convicted criminal,
sentenced to make restitution, to escape justice by the simple
expedient of listing the restitution order as a dischargable
debt in bankruptcy."
Respondent pled guilty to the crime of larceny of $9,900
in public assistance benefits.

The state court sentenced her

to a prison term, but suspended it, and placed her on probation
for five years on the condition that she make restitution to the

___

State of.......______
Connecticut at the rate of $100. per month.

There-

after, respondent petitioned for bankruptcy in the district
court of Connecticut, and listed in her schedule of creditors
the claim of Connecticut Office of Adult Probation (the
Probation Office) of $9,932. for restitution.

The bankruptcy

court notified the state authorities, but they took no action.
In due time, the bankruptcy court issued an order discharging
respondent from all dischargable debts.

The state agencies,

2.

No. 85-1033

that included Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance
as well as the Adult Probation Office took no action for
almost three years.

It then advised respondent that she

must resume payment.

She brought this suit in the Federal

bankruptcy court seeking a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and a finding that the state officials were in contempt
of the bankruptcy order.

8a--.4 -

The bankruptcy court, relying on its full opinion in a
-~

~
companion case, held that a criminal restitution order does ~

not constitute a bankrutpcy "debt" within the meaning of
§

{.

101(11), and that, even if it does, such a debt is a

~ .·
~~--&.,_,

,,~"-'

z . ~l J:;r.

"penalty" and thus exempt from discharge under § 523(a) (7) ·c..
The district court adopted the order and judgment of

·~"

the~~

'-

bankruptcy court.

On appeal, CA 2 - in an opinion by Judge t:}/1 2..,

Kearse, reversed.

It recognized that a majority of the

courts (three, possibly four CAs) had held that a criminal

_____.--'

restitution obligation is not a debt under the Bankruptcy
Code, but disagreed with these courts and reversed the DC .
The CA cited only one decision in support of this view,
In re Bro~ (Bankr. M.D.Tenn. 1984).

Judge Kearse is an

excellent judge, her opinion is carefully written, and was
joined by Judges Mansfield and Pratt .

The CA reasoned that

l

3.

No. 85-1033

the Act defines "debt" as a "right to payment", and that
restitution created a right to payment since the probation
agency had a right to receive and enforce payment of this
obligation.

Certainly a plausible argument can be made

along these lines, but I tentatively believe that CA 2 is
mistaken.

(])

In Connecticut, as elsewhere, a crime victim has no
right to determine the amount of restitution, and - according to the state's
restitution
mination,

brief ~o ~ight

hearin~no

an~o

even to tesify at a

right to appeal a restitution deter-

right to enforce payment.

agre~~~ had no " ~im".

The CA, in effect,

It held, rather, that

the pertinent state agencies - and particularly the Probation
Office - did have a claim dischargable in bankruptcy.

The

state's answer, relying on Connecticut law (that may well be
typical), is that neither the state court nor the Probation
Office holds a "claim" or "right to payment."
court

..----

~-lorder

The

~ .

sentencing ~

may ~lspend a prison sentence~~mpose probation, and ~~.
"
as a condition of probation the payment of restitution ~
~

"in an amount [the defendant] can afford to pay or provide in ~
a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby."
Criminal defendants ordered to make restitution must send

--

No. 85-1033

4.

their payments to the Probation Office that is an agency

-------

"within the judicial department" (citing the Connecticut
Statute), and the Probation Office- in turn- sends these
payments to the crime

vi~tim.

·-·

The probation officers who

monitor compliance with restitutionary orders, have authority
to apply to the sentencing court for an arrest warrant, or
notice to appeal, or may make a warrantless arrest, in the
event of a suspected violation of probation.

And, after

hearing, if the state "establishes a violation of probation,

---- -

the court may modify or enlarge the conditions of probation,
or

--·- ---it may revoke probation and order the defendant
~·---·-

--

- ---. ~--

--......_--

-~-

·--·

incarcerated."
~

I am tentatively inclined to agree that the foregoing system,

/ .•N".J. ~,..;'I"- entire 1 y
~-

.,.;.,./

lA

v-v.~

~-A~

"debtor,

~ ~hat

The state argues, alternatively, that even if one assumes
criminal restitution is a debt, it is excepted from dis-

~·~:harge

~

of judicial processes, creates no
-..::----creditor relationship" in any normal sense.

by§ 523(a)(7).

That provision makes nondischargable

"a fine, penalty or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit
of a governmental unit [that is] not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss.

This argument is consistent with what clearly

,,

must be sound public policy.

Indeed, although Judge Mansfield

joined Judge Kearse's opinion, he wrote a brief concurring

'

No. 85-1033

5.

opinion noting that the court had reached "an accurate but
unfortunate result.

In his view, the effect of the court's

decision often would be to "stultify and render useless criminal
restitution payments as a means of punishing persons convicted
of felonies . "
Respondent's brief, well .written by the New Haven Legal
Assistance Association lawyers, understandably relies primarily
on the reasoning of the court of appeals.

It also argues that

the failure of the state agency to interpose any objection to
the discharge of the restitution obligation should preclude it
from coming in subsequently and claiming that the court's
restitution order was still in effect.

Reliance is placed,

in support of this argument, on the statutory bar of claims
not filed by§ 523(c).

But this argument is flawed if the

state is correct that the court's order to pay restitution
was neither a "debt" or "claim" in the sense in which these
terms are used in bankruptcy.
Of course, respondent's main argument, following the
rationale of the court of appeals, is that a criminal restitution obligation is a debt.

While respondent's brief, like the

court of appeals' opinion, is lawyer-like and plausible, my tentative view is to reverse.
in the view of my Clerk.

I will, however, be quite interested
The bench memo need not be a long one,

No. 85-1033

6.

as I think I understand the issues .

I would like for my

Clerk to identify the decision or decisions of the courts
of appeals that support the position of the respective parties .

I have not read any of these.

L.F . P.

1
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l'/2-sBENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Ronald

No.

85-1033, Kelly v. Robinson

Question

Presented:

August 5, 1986

Is

a

criminal

restitution

order

dischargeable as a debt in bankruptcy?

Conclusion:

Both the plain meaning of the statute and

the legislative history indicate that the order in this case was
dischargeable.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

l.

In 1980,
state court.

resp pleaded guilty to larceny in Connecticut

The conviction arose out of resp's wrongful receipt

of some $10,000 in welfare benefits from the Connecticut Department of

Income Maintenance

(CDIM).

The

trial

judge

sentenced

resp to a suspended prison term of one to three years and probation of five years on the condition that resp make restitution
payments to the Connecticut Office of Adult Probation
the rate of $100 per month.

(COAP)

at

Under the Connecticut program, COAP

would enforce payment, but the monies received would be forwarded
to the victim, CDIM.
On February 5,

1981,

resp filed

a voluntary Chapter 7

bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Connecticut.

The bankruptcy judge set a deadline of

April 27, 1981, for objections to discharge.

Although the resti-

tution order was listed as a debt and the state was notified that
the debt would be discharged,
charge.

The

bankruptcy

court

the state did not object to disgranted

a

discharge

on May

14,

1981, at which time resp ceased making restitution payments.
COAP took no action until February 1984, when it asked
resp to resume payment.

Resp promptly filed

ceeding in the bankruptcy court,

an adversary pro-

seeking a declaration that the

1981 order had discharged the debt and an injunction against further

collection efforts.

resp's case,

Before

the bankruptcy judge ruled on

the state instituted proceedings in state court to

terminate resp's probation for failure to pay restitution.

Those

proceedings were stayed by the state courts pending disposition
of the adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court.

Eventually,

..).

the bankruptcy court rejected resp's claim in a brief order, relying on In re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. 129

(Bankr. D. Conn. 1984),

a companion case in which the court held that a criminal restitution order
code.

is

not a debt within the meaning of the bankruptcy

The district court adopted the proposed order and entered

judgment for the state.
On appeal, CA2 reversed in an opinion by Judge Kearse.
Judge

Kearse

remainder

reasoned

of

this

as

memo,

section number only]

on

a

11 U.S.C.

Section 101(11)

claim."

§727(b)

bankruptcy code sections

grants a discharge from

specified exceptions.
ability

follows.

Section

[for

the

are cited by

"all debts," with

defines a "debt" as "li-

101 (4)

defines

"claim"

in

the

broadest possible language, as "a right to payment whether or not
such

right

is

reduced

fixed,

contingent,

legal,

equitable,

to

judgment,

matured,
secured,

liquidated,

unmatured,
or

unliquidated,

disputed,

unsecured."

undisputed,

Acknowledging

that

most courts had reached a contrary conclusion, Judge Kearse concluded that the literal terms of section 101(4) are broad enough
to

include a

legislative

restitution obligation as
history

a

debt.

She relied on

that demonstrated Congress'

intent to give

"debt" the "broadest possible definition."

She pointed out the

practical problems with holding that a restitution claim was not
a debt within the meaning of the bankruptcy code; most importantly, the holder of a right to restitution would not be entitled to
participation in liquidation of the bankrupt's estate.
distinguished,

on

grounds

not

relevant

United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905

here,

other

CA2 then
CA

cases,

(CA2), cert. denied, 105 S.

4.

Ct.

599

(1984);

In

re

Davis,

691

F.2d

716

(CA3

1982);

and

Barnette v. Evans, 673 F.2d 1250 (CAll 1982).
Judge Kearse then turned to the dischargeability of the
debt.
of

Section 523(a) lists several exceptions to discharge.

these

that

arguably could

apply

obligation

only

if

dischargeability hearing, viz.
tences or by larceny.
cally

is

bar discharge of
the

creditor

the

Two

restitution

objects

the

at

for obtaining money by false pre-

The only exception that applies automati-

section 523 (a) (7),

which

prohibits

discharge

"to

the

extent such debt is for a fine, penalty or forfeiture payable to
and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss."
was a

"penalty"

and

"to and

for

Admitting that the obligation
the benefit of a governmental

unit," Judge Kearse held the debt was dischargeable because it
was "compensation for actual pecuniary loss."

First,

the rele-

vant Connecticut statute provides for payment "for the loss or
damage caused" by the crime.
case

was

failed

exactly

the

amount

Second, the amount assessed in this
stolen.

Thus,

because

to appear at the dischargeabili ty hearing,

the

state

the debt was

discharged.

II.

DISCUSSION

I

find little fault with Judge Kearse's analysis.
~-------------------------------------------

Ac-

cordingly, my discussion is brief and, for the most part, duplicative of her opinion.

::J •

A.

Is This Obligation a Debt

Under
claim."

the Bankruptcy Code,

a

debt

is

"liability on a

A claim is defined as any "right to payment, whether or

not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated,
fixed,

contingent,

matured,

unmatured,

legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured."

disputed,

undisputed,

The Bankruptcy Act of

1898 and the Chandler Act of 1938 applied the concept of "provable debts," which excluded many types of obligations from bankruptcy

proceedings.

The House

and Senate Reports

to

the

1978

Code indicate that Congress intended the "broadest possible definition" of claim, including "all legal obligations of the debtor,
no matter how remote or contingent."

Under the new Code, every

conceivable

to

obligation

was

bankruptcy jurisdiction.

intended

be

brought

within

the

Obligations that were due special pro-

tection either became "nondischargeable" or
in the distribution of funds.

received priorities

It is important to realize that if

a restitution obligation is not a "claim," two things must follow.

Not

only would

the

obligation

never

be

subject

to dis-

charge, but the obligation could never participate in the distribution of
scheme,

assets.

Considering

the

breadth of

the

legislative

the text of the statute, and the legislative history, I

think it is clear that this is a debt.
The best argument to the contrary appears in the Amicus
Brief for the States.

According to this argument, the obligation

is not a debt because collection is enforced not by confiscation
of property but by imprisonment.

.,

,· ...

Although this theory is inter-

6.

esting,

it has not support in the statutory language.

I am not

persuaded.

cases,

Petr

and

the

many

of

which

nonprovable

debts.

I

light of Congress'

amici

also

treated

think

these

discuss

at

length

restitution
are

utterly

pre-Code

obligations
irrelevant,

as
in

extensive revision of the statute and inser-

tion of broad new language.
Finally,

petr

argues

there is no right to payment.

that

this

is

not

a debt because

This strange conclusion rests only

on the fact that the payment is made to one agency for the benefit of another.
ground.

It

someone

who

The Bankruptcy Court's opinion rested on this

looked

to

has

claim.

a

the

Code's

definition of

a

creditor

Because the victim does

as

not have a

right to enforce collection, that Court held, there is no creditor-debtor relationship, and no debt.
with

this

argument

is

that

The most obvious problem

the definitions of debt and claim,

which govern the question of dischargeability, do not contain the
term "creditor."
Congress has drafted a broad statute here, intending to
cover the field.

-

utory

languag ~.

state's power

None of petr's arguments can overcome the statIn

my

view,

the

determinative

fact

to imprison resp if he failed to pay.

is

the

Thus,

the

state has a claim, and the obligation is a debt within the meaning of section 727(b).

B.

Dischargeability Under Section 523(a) (7)

7.

Section 523(a) (7) bars discharge for fines and penalties
only if they are to and for

the benefit of a governmental unit

and "not compensation for actual pecuniary loss."

In most cases,
In such

the victims of crimes will not be governmental units.
cases,

as petr concedes,

section 523(a) (7)

cannot bar discharge

because the payment will not be for the benefit of a governmental
unit.

Thus,

the

argument made for

nondischargeability in this

case, maugre the broad rhetoric of petr and the amici, can apply
only to restitution orders imposed for crimes committed against
governmental agencies.
I

am

persuaded

by

the

two

-·

arguments

, - - - --

First,

Kearse.
____....,

the

--

made

by

Judge

- .

-·

relevant Connecticut statute provides

payments are to be made "for the harm caused" by the crime.
me,

this puts these payments within the range of

for

actual

pecuniary

loss,"

at

least

in

this

crime was false receipt of welfare payments.

that
To

"compensation

case,

where

the

Second, the amount

assessed

in this case equalled the amount stolen and was to be

paid for

the benefit of the victim, powerful evidence that the

payments

were

"compensation"

within

the

meaning

of

section

this

point.

523 (a) (7).
Petr
First,

presents

only

brief

arguments

on

it argues that Congress could not possibly have intended

to force the states to come into bankruptcy proceedings to proteet

their

criminal

exaggerations.
will be exempted

judgments.

First,

the

This argument rests on several

run-of-the-mill

from discharge.

fine

automatically

Only with restitution orders

will preservation of the obligation require the creditor to ap-

8.

pear at the dischargeability hearing.
burden is excessive.
conviction

for

Second, I do not think the

If a state presents evidence of a criminal

larceny,

most

bankruptcy

judges

would

probably

summarily find that the debt was nondischargeable because it was
a debt "for larceny" under section 523 (a) (4).

Finally, Congress

expressly limited the automatic nondischargeability provision of
section 523(a) (7) so that it does not apply to restitution orders
for the benefit of private victims.

Thus, private victims have

to come in and protect their restitution claims.

Congress could

have intended to treat states similarly.
Second,

petrs

make bankruptcy a
not helpful.

That

point

"haven for

to

a

congressional

criminal offenders."

intent

not

to

But this

is

statement explains the existence of section

523(a) (7), which automatically bars discharge of criminal fines.
But petr refuses to acknowledge that the same section carefully
defines "fine," undercutting any argument for a loose interpretation of the word "fine."

III.

Conclusion

In short, I think CA2 was substantially correct.
ommend that you vote to affirm.
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Ronald

August 19, 1986

No. 85-1033, Kelly v. Robinson
Cert to CA2 (Kearse, Manfield (concurring), and Pratt)
Set for oral argument Wednesday October 8

memoranda~s
------------.

Once again, one of my bench
memo as a ship in the night.
case on August

1~

~(.J_pL

passed your file

You dictated a file memo in this

I mailed my bench memo to you on August

received your file memo on August 18.

5~

I

This memo adds two things

2.

to my earlier bench memo.
circuits.

First, I discuss the cases from other

Second, I address briefly the ground on which you have

tentatively rested your decision of the case.

I.

My
because I

Earlier Circuit Court Decisions

earlier

memo did

found them,

not

discuss

for the most part,

the

earlier

irrelevant.

decisions
They fall

into three classes.
First
Brown ,

7 44

The

of

all,

F . 2d

905 ,

second

u.s.

(CAll

1982).

own

cert.

group

Davis), 691 F.2d 176
1250

CA2's

decision

denied,

consists

of

in United

105

Davis

S.

v.

Ct.

States

599

v.

(1

Sheldon

(In

re

(CA3 1982), and Barnette v. Evans, 673 F.2d
These cases

rely on Younger

v.

Harris,

401

37 (1971), to reach the unsurprising conclusion that a bank-

ruptcy court cannot enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding,
even if those state proceedings might create an obligation enforceable against the bankrupt.
the

issue whether

In no way do these courts reach

the state criminal proceeding could create a

"debt" within the meaning of federal bankruptcy laws.

I assume

that the Kelly court would reach the same conclusion as these two
courts.
The final group are somewhat closer to the issue raised
in Kelly.

Here we

(CAS Unit B 1982)

find United States v.

Carson,

669 F.2d 216

(adopted by CAll in Barnette, supra), and Unit-

ed States v. Alexander, 743 F.2d 472 (CA7 1984).

In these cases,

federal courts held that a prior discharge of a debt in bankruptcy did not preclude imposition of restitution (under the federal
Victim Witness Protection Act)
ing.

I

in a subsequent criminal proceed-

think these cases are correct, although I acknowledge a

certain tension between them and Kelly.
as the Kelly court does,
tion is a "debt."

It is one thing to say,

that a preexisting restitution obliga-

It is another thing to say that this restitu-

tion obligation was

discharged

in a

bankruptcy proceeding that

took place before the restitution obligation was imposed.

In my

view, these cases involve two separate "rights to payment" within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
tual promise to pay.

One arose from the contrac-

The second arose from the criminal proceed-

ing.

In short, absent clear statutory language in the bankruptcy

code,

I would assume that the federal Victim Witness Protection

Act's grant of power
prior

discharge

in

to grant restitution is not limited by a

bankruptcy,

relying on

the

theory that

the

restitution obligation does not arise until it is imposed.

II.

Is a Restitution Order a "Debt" Even Though It Does not Cre-

ate a Debtor/Creditor Relationship?

'

'

'•,.

This

section

supplements

the

brief

discussion

argument on page 6 of my original bench memo.
that a debt cannot exist unless
ship--a right

of

this

The argument is

there is a bilateral relation-

to payment--from one debtor

to one creditor.

In

this case, the benefit of the payment has been separated from the
capacity to enforce payment.
do

not

think

that

this

Accordingly,

there is no debt.

argument can withstand

close

I

scrutiny.

Its only statutory support is the fact that the Bankruptcy Code
contains a definition of creditor, see 11

u.s.c.

§101(9)

(defin-

ing a creditor as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor
that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor").
The presence of this definition does not help the State
for two reasons.
pear

in any of

First of all, the word "creditor" does not apthe sections relevant to this case

101(4), 101(11), or 523(a)(7)).

(§§

727 (b),

More importantly, the definition

of creditor depends on the broad definition of claim in 101(4).
That

definition

forcement must

contains
be

no suggestion that

united with

the

rights of en-

the benefits of payment;

it re-

quires only a "right to payment."

v

As my bench memo pointed out, two arguments from general
statutory construction also undercut this argument significantly.
(
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a restitution order is not a debt subject to discharge,

then there is no statutory basis for allowing the beneficiaries
of restitution orders to participate in distribution of the bank--------------~
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~ upt's assets; I find such a result extremely unl i kely to have
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been

by Congress.
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is clear
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contemplated that ~ rtain restitution orders would be within the
definition of debt,
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because Congress specifically excluded them
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from the exception to discharge in 523 (a) (7).
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Please let me know if this memo has failed to confront
your concerns in this case.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Ronald

September 19, 1986

~: Jf~t~4 4~1
~ ~

Cv-u....r--1- 4 \:e~

No. 85-1033, Kelly v. Robinson
Cert to CA2

~

l'-t1-{_

~~~ ~
~~~

Set for oral argument in October~(e-v ~'f?

Your file memo and your annotation of my bench memo indicate that you are not likely to follGw the recommendation of my
bench memo.

This memo is designed to present to you the best of

the arguments inventive clerks have designed to reach the result

2.

you favor.

The general feeling is that the result reached by CA2

is so intrusive on the states that it is incumbent on this Court
to )/rewrite
explains,

statut~ '

the

to avoid that result.

As my bench memo

I

think the better course is to interpret the statute

as written.

This inclination, of course, rests on my failure to

perceive
This

the

states'

in itself

being among

interests

is unusual,

in

this

case

as

overwhelming.

because I have become accustomed to

the most deferential to the states on most issues.

The arguments attack CA2' s opinion at two levels.

~,

some

argue that restitution orders are ~ot. debts. ~' some argue
that, even if they are debts, they are nondischargeable.

I.

-----------------

Argument that restitution orders are not debts

This argument is fairly straightforward.

Congress indi...,_____~

cated quite clearly that it wanted the definition of debt to be

______________

all-inclusive with respect to the contingency, maturity, and security of
include

the obligation,

criminal

but

it

....._
never

indicated an

in that definition.

intent to

Several courts

had held criminal penalties not to be debts before passage of the
Bankruptcy Code.
decisions
Kovacs,

Congress'

indicates

105 S.

Ct.

~overrule

failure

an

intent

to

preserve

them.

Cf.

705

(1985)

(relying on Congress'

those

Ohio

v.

failure to

overrule preCede bankruptcy cases to find an explicit exception
to

the Code's

specific

statutory language).

Financial obliga-

tions arising out of state criminal justice systems were simply

.

,.

.

'

~,~

3

0

beyond the contemplation of Congress when it defined "debt" in
the Bankruptcy Code.
I am not at all persuaded by this.

Congress 1 complete

redrafting of the statute makes reliance on Kovacs inappropriate.
More importantly, this argument proves too much, because it asIt

\\

surnes that Congress did not intend cr irninal fines to be debts.
This is obviously incorrect, because Congress expressly excepted

to discharge a criminal fine if it was not a debt.

II.

Argument that restitution orders are always nondischargeable

under section 523 (a) (7)

This argument comes from a law clerk to Justice 0 1 Connor.

The first draft of what eventually became section 523 did

not provide for automatic discharge at all.

Under this draft,

every debt would be discharged unless the creditor carne in to
object to discharge.

Confronted with this, we may assume that

Congress inserted section 523(a) (7) to prevent state prosecutors
from having to justify cr irninal penal ties before federal bankruptcy judges.

The intent of section 523(a) (7) was to make auto-

rnatically dischargeable any debt that was imposed in a criminal
proceeding

that

would

be

subject

to discharge

upon objection

under sections 523(a) (1)-(6).

____

__

Although this argument is inventive, it....__
can be accepted
only by

,.

uage of the statute.

I am willing to admit that section 523(a) (7) was designed to pro-

4

vide automatic dischargeability for criminal penalties.
is

impossible

dischargeability
523(a) (1)-(6).

to

read

section

anything

for
Such

the

a

as

providing

dischargeable

section would

read

But it

automatic

under

"to the

0

sections

extent

such

debt was imposed in a criminal proceeding and would be subject to
discharge under subdivisions (1) through (6) of this subsection."
As drafted,

the section reads "to the extent such debt

is for a fine •.. payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss."

To

my knowledge, n~ne has yet suggested a plausible purpose for the
highlighted language except to prevent automatic dischargeability
of restitution orders.

As I see it,

that language was inserted

to carve out an exception for restitution orders.
drafted

this

exception for

restitution orders,

When Congress

it assumed that

restitution orders would always be payable "for the benefit of"
the private entity harmed.

Thus,

it defined fines,

in part, as

payments "to and for the benefit of a governmental unit."
This case presents the more unusual_ situation of a restitution
order payable "to and for the benefit of a governmental
___..,..._....
unit," clearly satisfying the first prong of the definition of a

~ Thus, the Court could hold that this restitution order is
nondischargeable by saying that the second part of the fine definition--"not
here.

compensation

for

actual

pecuniary

loss"--is

met

Such a conclusion would rest on the notion that a restitu-

tion order imposed in a criminal proceeding partakes of rehabilitative and punitive purposes,
'-..__../

In my bench memo I

but not of compensatory purposes.

outline my reasoning against this position.

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _....._...-r,_ _ _ - - - -

5.

In this memo,

I

that

restitution

criminal

note only that

this would lead to the anomaly

orders

for

thefts

from

I~~
~

individuals

would be dischargeable, while orders for thefts from the government would be nondischargeable.

When I drafted my bench memo, I

thought this anomaly would be intolerable.
it would

be

ill-advised,

I

must

While I still think

acknowledge

that

this

anomaly

would salvage some degree of the state's interests, by elevating
the status of debts for thefts from states.

Unfortunately, there

~~~--~~------~--~

is not a

shred of legislative history supporting a distinction

between restitution orders based on the private or public character of the victim.

Thus,

if you feel compelled to reverse, the best course

would be:

(1) A restitution order is a debt
(2)

Restitution orders are not "compensation for actual

pecuniary loss" within the meaning of section 523(a) (7)
( 3)

Thus,

restitution

orders

for

thefts

from private

parties are dischargeable only upon objection, while restitution
orders for thefts from states are automatically nondischargeable.

(

?
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I conclude that criminal restitution obligations are
not dischargeable in bankruptcy by virtue of §523(a) (7) of the
bankruptcy statute.

I

reach this result by concluding that the

exception to non-dischargeability in that section for "compensation for actual pecuniary loss" refers only to civil compensatory
obligations.
First, criminal res ti tut ion obligations should be regarded as "debts" under the bankruptcy code.

They were not so

regarded under the old code because they were regarded as nonprovable.
Act,

In abolishing the provability requirement in the 1978

Congress eliminated the rationale for characterizing crimi-

nal penalties as non-debts.

Furthermore, the state has a "right

to payment" under the code, since it may enforce the restitution
obligation by seeking revocation of probation if it is not fulfilled.
Section 523(a) (7), however, bars discharge of such obligations, because the exception to non-dischargeability in that
section encompasses only civil compensation.
rests on the following analysis.

This conclusion

Congress modified §57j of the

old code in the 1978 Act by making allowable the claims for nonpecuniary compensation-- civil and criminal -- that were not
allowed under the old code.

See §726(a) (4).

Normally, if claims

are allowable against the estate, the obligation in question is

-

discharged.

2 -

Congress sought to prevent this consequence of mak-

ing ron-pecuniary claims allowable by specifically providing in
§523 (a) (7) that these claims are ron-dischargeable.

The ration-

ale for this ron-dischargeability is that the state's interest in
such claims is rot merely as just arother creditor, but is penal
as well.
Congress therefore provided general language in
§523(a)(7) indicating that claims owed to the government were
non-dischargeable.

It ronetheless sought to preserve the

dischargeability of claims owed to the government that had been
dischargeable under the old code-- namely, civil compensatory
claims.

These claims, unlike ron-compensatory claims, are given

priority in bankruptcy.

Section 501 (6) (G) lists among the claims

given first priority claims civil in nature that are "compensation for actual pecuniary loss" -- the identical language used in
§523(a) (7).

The state's interest in such claims is essentially

as a creditor, which is why it makes sense to give those claims
priority and to except them fran the ron-dischargeability otherwise imposed by §523(a) (7).

Any criminal penalty, however, is

not discharged under that exception, because the state's claim is
not merely as a creditor, but is penal.
The ron-dischargeability of criminal restitution obligations
is thus consistent with the way in which Congress sought to modify the old code.

Furthermore, had Congress intended to take the

radical step of significantly interfering with state criminal
judgnents, it would have said so in language much more explicit
than we have before us.
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A.
Respli ask ~s eo l!OM that restitution orders imposed in crimC~2.. ~ iud4
~ al proceedings are debts that are dischargeable in bankruptcy. u..-...t-~
II.

B.

1' s-2 g"(.-t..Jt?j

This would infringe important state interests
1.

states
2.

Criminal

Proceedings

are

uniquely a

province

for

~~-

the

~

• ..,.

A-1-t-

+

~~~
This would require state prosecutors to come into federal

court seeking a discharge
3.

In ~ ases, whether the prosecutors objected or not,

4.

Resps suggest that this problem would be alleviated by

~7;-~~ ~~'--~~~.r

criminal judges considering the bankruptcy law aspects of
restitution orders.

We hesitate seriously before requiring
expected to know

c.
/ C) ac-c-ep
("_) provis1on.
cl~r

4e L

This language

as the state s 1nterests.

page 2.

III.

History

ul l..LJ-r ~

~kL J'tu_ 1

q 7 .%"" ~ ;-. r-Jt--

t-r Ju_, ~

A. U~ the 1898 Act (and older Acts, if available), these Pyn~...,.~ ~~~< ~~~~~~~~
al ties were completely excluded.
Citing Cases, Collier's, Nor- dLa"4 ~of
ton's,

legislative history of new Code.

In the bankruptcy area

we have required a clear command to assume that Congress ever -

~'-04--~1 -L--2-~~1 ~

r~.

B.

See your Midlantic opinion.

Legislative history of the 1978 Code.

106

s.

Ct. 755.

Indication to br aden

debt, but no indication of a desire to interfere with the
criminal processes.

IV.
A.

B.

Resolution
This is a debt
This

is

automatically

nondischarge

523 (a) (7) as a "fine or penalty."

under

section

~~ ·
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October 17, 1986

To:
From:
Re:

Justice Powell
Ronald
No. 85-1033, Kelly v. Robinson

I attach a draft for your opinion in this case.
You will
not be surprised to hear that I have had several problems in preparing this draft.
Although I have read your opinions, I have
not read your editing. Thus, I do not have an adequate feel for
what you want. My aim has been the lower goal--to produce something you can easily change into a circulable opinion--rather
than the higher goal--to present you a circulable opinion and
expect you to change nothing.
This memo details several of the
conscious choices I made while writing tlie draft.
~ ~~~
1.
Throughout the draft I refer
ed as ~
~
dischargeability of restitution orders
riminal ~
proceedings. There is no suggestion that the rule
d be different in federal criminal proceedi~9~, but the interests of the
states seem so much mose compelling ~ y referring constantly to
state proceedings, the opinion may gain a slight emphasis that it
would not have otherwise. Similarly, I refer regularly to federal bankruptcy courts, even though there are, of course, no state
bankruptcy courts.

im- ~ ~~

2.
Frequently I use circumlocutions like "restitution
posed as a condition of probation" rather than the simple "resti- p-~~
tution order."
I am quite ambivalent about such awkward phrase~~~
·
ology.
But it may focus the reader on the penal source of the 'I ~ ~
orders being discharged.
tl"o-5§§ §#3.
There
roblems i s
ble on the M••·Jtk.f
present record.
, t e state ju ge or ered Robinson to pay ~
_
$100 a month. · She stopped when she had paid . $450.
I presume ~~
{ that she paid a half-payme~t
r one of the months, but have no
,,
s~lbasis for this statement.
ec
, as you remember from oral ar- ~~
\/I gument, the total amount o
the restitution obligation is un- '~tf..~
clear. As I have noted in the draft, the judge stated the total ~~~~
amount to be $9,932.95, but set a payment schedule totaling - ~-..,A..~. .
$6,000.
It may not be coincidental that Robinson's bankruptcy ( .J ~
pet~~
two debts
to
the Connec 1cut gove n nt:
.,_,.
$9,~.:S~.~~ - 1:0 the probation office, and $6,000 to the income as'&.C.L,)
sistance office.
Nothing in the record explains the source of
the $6,000 debt.
The state challenged the discharge of both
debts.
For reasons that are unclear, the bankruptcy judge summarily rejected the challenge to discharge of the $6,000 debt.
Discharge of that debt is not before the Court. ~ ~1..ll.-1- ~.- I;,..Jl7 ~I- 4
in
s pro ab e tlia
, 0 debt was entirely ~ ~ ""L,.
separate from the $9,932.95 theft before the Court. Thus, I as- ~~~ ~1
]

l

"""-

-"K.d -t

~~
c.'}-.
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sume it is only a coincidence that the restitution payments
scheduled totaled $6,000.
This conclusion is undermined by the
Second Circuit 1 s listing of both debts in its opinion.
If the
debts are related, it may be that this restitution order was assessed in addition to a civil obligation to repay.
This would
certainly bolster the result the Court is reaching in this case. ~ I
You may wish to inquire of the parties as to the relevant facts ~
I think that would be unnecessary, however.
The sense of
the Court is clearly that all restitution orders imposed by criminal courts are nondischargeable, whether they go to a private
victim or a public victim, whether they supplement or replace a
civil obligation.
Thus, the actual state of the facts is not
particularly important. d..7"''t·
4.
In light of your comments on my bench memo, I have dispensed entirely with the acronyms used by the parties, adopting
instead the more comprehensible formulations "probation office"
and "public assistance office."

of{:;;'

5.
I am uncomfortable with the length
section
plaining the reasoning of the courts below r
I have left
bankruptcy court discussion lengthy because it parallels
analysis.
I have left the CA2 discussion lengthy because
said you thought it was entitled to respect. ~1111r

~

{)

-

ex- }
the
our
you

6.
I am not entirely satisfied with the organization. You
will notice that I discuss the creation of the exception and the
state 1 s interests before I turn to the statute.
I tried one
draft, starting with section 523 (a) (7), and then turning to these
sources, but it did not work well.
I think _the ~iscussj o ~of the
lower court o 'nions ade uately sets the stage t or the historical
d tac uspion, which 1n turn sets
e r a er s frame of m1nd before
we finally confront the statute.
7.
I have included references to your dissent in TVA v.
~
Hill wherever comments made there supported the analysis here. ~~
Some of these probably should be suppressed. Because two members ~
of the majority in this case expressly disagreed with you in TVA,
it may not be appropriate to call so much attention to it.
By ~
including all the relevant quotations, I hope I have made it eas- ~
ier for you to choose those you most favor.
In fact, you will
find an unsuitably high number of block quotations.
I hope this
allows you to select the quotes you like the best, or to eliminate the quotations entirely and rephrase the ideas in your language.

So

8.
I have refused to decide the debt question, as we
agreed.
I think it wou l d oe-extr'"aordinar1"Iy d ifl: 1cu lt to write
an opinion concluding that it is not a debt. The Code expressly
provides for payment of fines in §726 (a) (4).
The legislative
history is replete with references to this.
Moreover, it would
be somewhat inconsistent with the framework I have devised to
explain the analysis of §523(a) (7).
If some people are likely to
disagree on this point, we should elevate it to the status of a

r
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subpart, to enable the disagreeing Justices to pinpoint the portion of the opinion with which they disagree.
9. I have examined the "to and for the benefit of a governmental unit" language, although in this case it would be easy to
say that the payment was "for the benefit of a governmental unit"
because it was forwarded to the state public assistance office.
I rejected that approach because it would lead to another case,
in which we would be called on to adjudicate the dischargeability
of restitution orders for money sto~en from private individuals.
I gather that the sense of the Conference is that all restitution
orders should be nondischargeable. I do not think we need leave
this question open, inviting another case, which would produce
another difficult opinion. Thus, I have decided the question in
this draft.

Draft Opinion for the Court in No. 85-1033

John J. Kelly, Connecticut Chief State's Attorney, et al.,
Petitioners

v.

Carolyn Robinson, Respondent

We granted review in this case to decide whether
restitution obligations, imposed as conditions of
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Rider A, p. 10 (Kelly)

KELLYA SALLY-POW
The Court of Appeals nevertheless found support for its
holding in the fact that Connecticut officials probably
could have ensured continued enforcement of their court's
criminal judgment against Robinson had they objected to
discharge under §523(c).

this may be true in many

cases, it hardly justifies an interpretation of the 1978
Act that is contrary to the long prevailing view that
"fines and penalties are not affected by a discharge".
Collier on Bankruptcy, id.
Moreover, reliance on a right to appear and
object to discharge would create uncertainties and impose
undue burdens on state officials.

In some cases it would

·-

~,l,cd., ~,.-.. ~ ~ ~

,.~~~~~~~

J-t...-v

,9<

1

$ ... ~<

require state prosecutors to defend particular state
criminal judgments before the federal bankruptcy courts. 8

/\:

8.

,

ur ~~ ~

In some cases principle of issue preclusion could

"'
obviate the need

of factual questions,

or interpretations of state

1~

bankruptcy cour .

Differences between the elements of crime and the
provisions
of issue preclusion.

Moreover, apart from the burden on

state officials of following and participating in
bankruptcy proceedings, there is the unseemliness of
requiring state prosecutors to submit the judgments of

~Is .

their criminal courts to federal bankruptcy
'\

~udgss.~

2.

probation in state criminal proceedings, are dischargeable

ClAc:-~tt r

1 of .\-\.--v"~~'flr'/ C-, aQ.., I

~,

v. s.c. .

~q:Yo) .. ~

I.

~J D. fl<'o-pi tc..~t.d ~

t ...

llt

In 1980, Carolyn Robinson pled guilty to larceny
in the second degree.

The

c."-c.·~4t..CQRV16~ie~

was based on her

wrongful receipt of $9,932.95 in welfare benefits from the
Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance.

On November

14, 1980, the Connecticut Superior Court sentenced

}

foe~,...S""'~""O«Ill"'ll'lu~.;;:;

ehe~

t- ~"~~~0"'"'

plai~tif f( to a prison term of not less than one year nor

more than three years.

The court suspended execution of

J

L
__,,..,.er~ymo'"'W""'H.t!>CX_.t-~

~.-\1\St.-.
.J

the sentence and placed the p laiu t irt_ on probation for
five years.

As a condition of probation, the judge

3.

ordered Robinson to make restitution 1 to the State of
Connecticut Office of Adult Probation (Probation Office)

~~------------~

at the rate of $100 (§9 per month, commencing January 16,
1981, and continuing until the end of her probation. 2
On February 5, 1981, Robinson filed a voluntary

petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 u.s.c.

...c

~

d- -

§701 766

'

in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the

District of Connecticut.

That petition listed the

5t.+s ovt
lconnecticut
§53a-30 eescriee s the conditions
impose on a sentence of probation.
a trial
Clause 4 of that section authorizes a condition that the
defendant
make restitution of the fruits of his offense or
make restitution, in an amount he can afford to
pay or provide in a sui table manner, for the
loss or damage caused thereby and the court may
fix
the amount thereof and
the manner of
performance.

~

i~
'So-..
IM~+c;,.:,.-\--j 11-bovtrc,lo'\JI'u•
•:lc- Aa~i "!or

"'Tk.rc.-

2 ~·

"'"'""g·• ;;:: .-

~ -+kL -+otc;.) c:Y\1\ow.+ rtsn-..).,_..jwo-s d1"~t.rt.J to ~""r ;_

.

he
amount .of
r~st1tut1on f ~
.
.~
ely- cle a r }L- (c.J:Liulle""·
A though the JUdge 1mposed rest1tut1on 1n a total amount
of $9,932.95, five years of payments at one hundred
dollars a month
only $6000.

te

·h\-... )

4.

restitution obligation as a debt.
the Bankruptcy Court notified

On February 20, 1981,

bot~

the Connecticut

agencies of Robinson's petition and informed them that
April 27, 1981, was the deadline for filing

(

discharge.

~pa F enk ly 'beeatJ:se ~he

~jections

to

~

r~.HJo-r~tLy btc.e-J\t- ~, \
a~ etk<U-e net +erotc..+a....- ~os;-4-~o-

or

Robinson's
objections to

discharg~ • Thus~ agencies

did not

participate in the distribution of Robinson's estate.

On

May 14, 1981, the bankruptcy court granted Robinson a
~.(...

discharge.

~ l§727.

~

-,..,..--~
R:t::ortbr.ii:-rrn:tsrro:rrrr(JCOII'"c1
:mrnprrrl"t1~e~d-s
sn::art:b~s;;t=<a'f'lr,..rt
t:+ia
a-=t-1-tlvy--v.
wr-ii-tt~hHt~h<w>e

,.

<-o cond1 t 1ons of her probat i on tl:llli l ~he r e oeiued -the

+N...

~

~b;,._so ...... re.c.e.-l., ... J ~ d~~~o-r'lr-

d i sehar 9e i n haRk rYpecy. At ~t time( she had paid a
,. . _ 'f\1.~1--~ t--JhH\ ·
total of $450~ On May 20, 1981, her attorney wrote the

1 v.

OGWc.r'i>h..h

5.

Probation Office that he believed the discharge had
altered the conditions of Robinson's probation, voiding
the condition that she pay restitution.

Robinson made no

further payments.
The Connecticut Probation Office did not respond
to this letter until February 1984, when it informed
Robinson that it considered the obligation to pay
restitution nondischargeable.

Robinson responded by

filing an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court,
seeking a declaration that the restitution obligation had
been discharged, as well as an injunction to prevent the
State's officials from forcing Robinson to pay.
After a trial, the Bankruptcy Court entered a
Memorandum and Proposed Order, concluding that the 1981
discharge in bankruptcy had not altered the conditions of

6.

Robinson's probation.

The court adopted the analysis it

had applied in a similar case decided one month earlier,
In re Pellegrino

(Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal

Justice), 42 B. R. 129 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Conn. 1984).
In Pellegrino, the court began with the
Bankruptcy Code's definitional sections.

First, §101(11)

defines a "debt" as a "liability on a claim."

In turn,

§101(4) defines a "claim" as a "right to payment, whether
or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured."

Finally, §101(9) defines a "creditor" as an

"entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at
the time of or before the order for relief concerning the
debtor."

7.

The Bankruptcy Court then examined the statute
under which the Connecticut judge had sentenced the debtor
to pay restitution.

Restitution appears as one of the

conditions of probation enumerated in Conn. Gen. Stat.
§53a-30.

Under that section, restitution payments are

sent to the Probation Office.
fl

forwarded to

The payments then are
•

0

th~ vic;i~( ~1~~0~:--~he

Connecticut

penal code does not provide for enforcement of the
probation conditions by the victim, it does authorize the
trial court to issue a warrant for the arrest of a
"-'ho

~

~~ (rr

c/

criminal defendant Lf-ae violate $ ~ conditiong of
~.,.

probation.

§53a-32.

Because the Connecticut statute does not allow
o-

the victim to enforce R4£ right to receive payment, the
court concluded that neither the victim nor the Probation

8.

+

\1\e;-t-h,-- w~s OweJ

Office had a "right to payment, and hence
the Bankruptcy Code.

"debt" under

It argued:

Unlike an obligation which arises out of a
contractual, statutory or common law duty, here
the obligation is rooted in the traditional
responsibility of a state to protect its
citizens by enforcing its criminal statutes and
to rehabilitate an offender by imposing a
criminal sanction intended for that purpose. 42
B. R., at 133.

The court acknowledged the tension between its conclusion
~ p0. "\'j i '(Q.,

and the Code's

~c

definition of debt, but found an

exception to the statutory definition in "the longstanding tradition of restraint by federal courts from
interference with traditional functions of state

governments."

Id., at (

l'3~

~ ~ec;V;t up~
The ( court conb luded that, even if the probation
b,.,...\l,r" p't-~

condition was a debt subject to

~

jur i sdiction, it was

9.

nondischargeable under §523(a) (7) of the Code.

~ction

That

provides that a discharge in bankruptcy does not

affect any debt that "is for a fine, penalty, or
forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss."
The court concluded that the purpose of the
restitution condition was "to promote the rehabilitation
of the offender, not to compensate the victim."
at 137.

42 B. R.,

It specifically rejected the argument that the

restitution must be deemed compensatory because the ~
judge ba<L set the amount

victim's loss.

t.- pre~ ';~~~f
\ ..

the

It noted that the state statute allows an

offender "to make restitution of the fruits of his offense
or make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or

10.

provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage
caused thereby," Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a-30(a) (4).

In its

view, the Connecticut statute focuses "upon the offender
and not on the victim, and ••• restitution is part of the
criminal penalty rather than compensation for a victim's
actual loss."

42 B. R., at 137.

Thus, the Bankruptcy

Court held that the bankruptcy discharge had not affected
the conditions of Pellegrino's probation.

The United

States District Court for the District of Connecticut
adopted the Bankruptcy Court's proposed dispositions of
Pellegrino and this case without alteration.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed.
debt.

It first examined the Code's definition of

Although it recognized that most courts had reached

the opposite conclusion, the court decided that a

11.

restitution obligation imposed as a condition of probation
is a debt.

It relied on the legislative history of the

Code that evinced Congress's intent to broaden the
definition of "debt" from the much narrower definition in o~
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.

The court also noted

~~~f

p .... ;':lkt
anomalies tfl6t could result from a conclusion that such an

obligation

IS
~

not a debt.

Most importantly, nondebt

status would deprive a state of the opportunity to
participate in distribution of the bankrupt's estate.
Having concluded that restitution obligations are
debts, the court turned to the question of
dischargeability.

w

The court stateL that the appropriate

Connecticut agency probably could have avoided discharge

12.

of the debt if it had objected under §§523(a) (2) or
523(a) (4) of the Code ~

~o<r

c--As no objections

to discharge were filed, the

court concluded that the state could rely only on

~ provides

---2

S523(a) (7),

~h"

automatic ~ischargeabilit

::::: 4-~..-.t
s"hse.c..H ov-

for

"•"' 1·

~ ()+
•4

The court then looked to the text of the Connecticut

3section 523 (a) (2) (A) protects from discharge debts "for
obtaining money, property, services, or an extension,
renewal, or refinance of credit, by false pretenses, a
false representation, or actual fraud." Section 523 (a) (4)
protects from discharge debts "for fraud or defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or
larceny."
Under §523 (c), debts that are protected from
discharge only by §523 (a} ( 2) or § 523 (a} ( 4} are discharged
unless the creditor files an objection to discharge during
the
bankruptcy
proceedings.
Because
Robinson
was
convicted of
larceny,
one of
the
debts
listed
in
§523 (a) (4), it is quite likely that the Bankruptcy Court
would have found the debt nondischargeable under that
subsection.
4The requirement that creditors object to discharge is
limited on its face to paragraphs (2}, (4}, and (6} of
§523(a}.
Because paragraph 7 is not listed there, debts
described
in
that
paragraph
are
automatically
nondischargeable, under the general rule prescribed in the
opening clause of §523 (a)
(providing that a "discharge
under section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an
individual debtor from any debt" listed in the paragraphs
that follow) .

13.

statute to determine whether Robinson's probation
condition was "compensation for actual pecuniary loss"
within the meaning of §523(a) (7).

But where the

Bankruptcy Court had considered the entire state probation
system, the Court of Appeals focused only on the language
that

allo~

restitution order to be assessed "for the

loss or damage caused [by the crimel ," Conn. Gen. Stat.
§53a-30(a) (4).

The court thought this language compelled

the conclusion that the probation condition was
"compensation for actual pecuniary loss."

It held,

therefore, that this particular condition of Robinson's
probation was not protected from discharge by §523(a} (7).
Accordingly, it reversed the District Court.
We granted the State's petition for a writ of
certiorari.

We have jurisdiction to review the judgment

14.

of the Court of Appeals under 28

u.s.c.

§1254(1).

We

reverse.

II.

The Court of Appeals' decision focused primarily
on the language of §§101 and 523 of the Code.

Of course,

the "starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language itself."
Manor Drug Stores, 421
concurring}.

u.s.

Blue Chip Stamps v.

723, 756 (1975}

(POWELL, J.,

But the text is only the starting point.
,~

JUSTICE O'CONNOR explained last term, "In expounding a
~

statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and polic; J n

Offshore

As

Draft Opinion for the Court in No. 85-1033, Kelly

v~

Robinson

We granted review in this case to
feder;al

~r..J..Wtc¥ ~~

~~
decide A~

~
-sat:1....Qie:sl:lar9-e 1'\restitution

obligations imposed as conditions of probation in state
)

~~,e.~

criminal proceeding ~

A

I.

'-...--

~

~~ .-~vl---ef.

2.

~d.
In 1980, Carolyn Robinson pleeded guilty to

larceny in the second degree.

The conviction was based on

her wrongful receipt of $9,932.95 in welfare benefits from
the Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance.

On

November 14, 1980, the Connecticut Superior Court
sentenced the plaintiff to a prison term of not less than
one year nor more than three years.

The court suspended

execution of the sentence and placed the plaintiff on
probation for five years.

As a condition of probation,

the judge ordered Robinson to make restitutionl to ~ he

~L ~

f ~«~~"#·~
State of Connecticut Office of Adult Probation at the rate
1\

lconnecticut Gen. Stat. §53a-30 describes the conditions
a trial judge can impose on a sentence of probation.
Clause 4 of that section authorizes a condition that the
defendant
make restitution of the fruits of his offense or
make restitution, in an amount he can afford to
pay or provide in a sui table manner, for the
loss or damage caused thereby and the court may
fix the amount thereof and the manner of
(Footnote continued)

3.

of $100.00 per month, commencing January 16, 1981, and
continuing until the end of her probation.2
On February 5, 1981, Robinson filed a voluntary
petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§§701-766, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Connecticut.

That petition listed the

restitution obligation as a debt.

On February 20, 1981,

the Bankruptcy Court notified both of the Connecticut
agencies of Robinson's petition and informed them that
April 27, 1981, was the deadline for filing objections to
discharge.

Apparently because the agencies did not

(Footnote 1 continued from previous page)
performance.

(
({l

I

~

2The amount of restitution is not entirely clear.
Although the judge imposed restitution in a total amount
of $9,932.95, five years of payments at one hundred
'
dollars a month 1s
only $6000.

~~
~

4.

believe the bankruptcy would affect the conditions of
Robinson's probation, they did not file proofs of claim or
objections to discharge.

Thus, the agencies did not

participate in the distribution of Robinson's estate.

On

May 14, 1981, the bankruptcy court granted Robinson a
discharge.

~~

See §727.

Robinson complied

~{~ ions

1

of her

probation until she received the discharge in bankruptcy.
At that time she had paid a total of $450.
1981, her attorney wrote the
i~

eenn~ ticut

On May 20,

¥ robation

~ fice~

that he believed the discharge had altered

the conditions of Robinson's probation, voiding the
condition that she pay restitution.
further payments.

Robinson made no

5.

The

Ce"'"!~ut

fr ob tion

~fice

did not respond

to this letter until February 1 84, when it informed
Robinson that it

consi~ered

.. ,..

the oenrclttiou of prol9e:t d

~~nondischargeable.

Robinson

responded by filing an adversary proceeding in the
Bankruptcy Court, seeking a declaration that the
restitution

o~o~::d

been discharged, as well as an

injunction to prevent the State's officials from forcing

Robins ~
~L1f

After a

~f

trial, the Bankruptcy Court entered

a Memorandum and Proposed Order, concluding that the 1981
discharge in bankruptcy had not altered the conditions of
Robinson's probation.

The aan ~~ptcy f ourt adopted the

analysis it had applied in a similar case decided one
month earlier, In re Pellegrino

(Pellegrino v. Division

)

6.

of Criminal Justice), 42 B. R. 129 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Conn.
1984) •
In Pellegrino, the B-aniEr!iptgy rjour t began with
the Bankruptcy Code's definitional sections.

First,

§101(11) defines a "debt" as a "liability on a claim."

In

turn, §101(4) defines a "claim" as a "right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured."

Finally, §101(9) defines a

"creditor" as an "entity that has a claim against the
debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for
relief concerning the debtor."
The Bankruptcy Court then examined the statute
under which the Connecticut judge had sentenced the debtor

7.

to pay restitution.

Restitution appears as one of the

conditions of probation enumerated in Conn. Gen. Stat.
§53a-30.

Under that section, restitution payments are

sent to the

C~t

co~ith

The-probation
victim.

the

D

~

-

~

'£robation _ofcfice
.£6 wh-i:-O!h

-

tri~

o~r-wa~s

,

m~

•

probation

conaition~

r;;e paymentsJ.~e~m~

Although the Connecticut penal code does not

provide for enforcement of the probation conditions by the
victim, it does authorize the trial court to issue a
warrant for the arrest of a criminal defendant if he
violates the conditions of

~ probation.

§53a-32.

Because the Connecticut statute does not allow
the victim to enforce

tf::r~t

.to

-o~; QgQ;i,IJQ

payment, the

Bankruptcy Court concluded that the victim has no "right

8.

to payment," and hence no "debt" under the Bankruptcy
Code.

It argued:

Unlike an obligation which arises out of a
contractual, statutory or common law duty, here
the obligation is rooted in the traditional
responsibility of a state to protect its
citizens by enforcing its criminal statutes and
to rehabilitate an offender by imposing a
criminal sanction intended for that purpose. 42
B. R., at 133.

The B~y ¢ourt acknowledged the tension between its
conclusion and the Code's specific definition of debt, but
found an exception to the statutory definition in "the
long-standing tradition of restraint by federal courts
from interference with traditional functions of state
governments."

Id., at .

The Bankruptcy Court

concluded that, even if

the probation condition was a debt subject to its

9.

jurisdiction, it was nondischargeable under §523(a) (7) of
the Code.

That section provides that a discharge in

bankruptcy does not affect any debt that "is for a fine,
penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss."
A

~, 'lhe

Bankruptcy Court concluded that the purpose

of the restitution condition was "to promote the
rehabilitation of the offender, not to compensate the
victim."

42 B. R., at 137.

It specifically rejected the

argument that the restitution must be deemed compensatory
because the state judge had set the amount at the precise
amount of the victim's loss.

It noted that the state

statute allows an offender "to make restitution of the

10.

fruits of his offense or make restitution, in an amount he
can afford to pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the
loss or damage caused thereby," Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a30(a)(4).

In its view, the Connecticut statute focuses

"upon the offender and not on the victim, and •••
restitution is part of the criminal penalty rather than
compensation for a victim's actual loss."
137.

42 B. R., at

Thus, the Bankruptcy Court held that the bankruptcy

discharge had not affected the conditions of Pellegrino's
probation.

The United States District Court for the

District of Connecticut adopted the Bankruptcy Court's
H...-v~
proposed dispositions of Pellegrino and ~without

alteration.

e) , aSst I et::U 'dz ~,. t:.. ~ RobiAOOA appealed to~ e Court of Appeals for the

61

Second

-

""'-

Circui ~ ~h

reversed.

That

1-r

eo~t

first examined

11.

the Code's definition of debt.
/

courts faeee

r;;;;::

~· ;;b

conclusion, the ~ decided that a restitution

~~

~
*'•
··~
.:VVr,
.5~'

that most

issue had reached the opposite

~

~~

~ fD

~i~ ~ t~g

~~~g

obligation imp: sed as a condition of probation is a debt.
The !'lOiRe i!'&l -l>as.i.li...fnr...J:J:Iis..gopcl

~· ~'"'"'~~ ~

j I ;vod..-.L ,..._. H-<~egislative history of the Co~ which evinced Congress's
in~ent

to broaden the definition of "debt:· from tl!e ....e11

~ ~rrower definition ~ in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
~~r
~
~

,

~~H1-t

~
~

~?
~-

~ ~wl£·''"al-

L

The ~ourt also noted S€~e~ anomalies that woYld ~roceed
A

from a conclusion that such an obligation was not a debt.

a....

Most importantly, nondebt status would deprive efte;{tate
of an opportunity to participate in distribution of the
bankrupt's

T

12.

Having concluded that restitution obligations
~

1\

debts, the

~~- v1 ~,_

~t

dischargeability.

hs

~e

turned to the question of
Second

~~nc ~ probably

~ d-h.lezl ~ ~

CLrc~i &- reeo9RiBe 0 ,

tbe

.ll

could have avoided discharge

.
.t.-~~AJ~
of the debt if Ait bag~ under §§523(a) (2) or
523 (a) (4) of the Code. 3
Because the

COHfl~~ es-..J:l.ad "-ff:o t;-..

a..:v ~

f i

~d

~ ~,.4>. ~-:-~ ~ ~ J./J.-

~objections to discha~A~ could rely only on

~~~

3section 523 (a) (2) CA) protects from discharge debts "for
obtaining money, property, services, or an extension,
renewal, or refinance of credit, by false pretenses, a
false representation, or actual fraud." Section 523(a) (4)
protects from discharge debts "for fraud or defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or
larceny."
Under §523 (c), debts that are protected from
discharge only by §523Ca) C2) or §523(a) (4) are discharged
unless the creditor files an objection to discharge during
the bankruptcy proceedings.

_ t-t...C , ::. ~~
;t..A_ ~
~-k.. "~~ ~ ~ .-&.-"1~-c,., 1- ~ -M-ce..
4

A

~~ ~AA~~~

~4-~
~~"
~ · ..-....-·""''!!!!!!JIF!IIo:::'j • .h, A , ~" ~
~~~· J,...._u.e·~,..

w-z_~ ~ ~

'f f >2 -,(_4-..) 2_,-L-Zc

13.

f!.A-f-

§523(a) (7),

~ provides

dischargeabili ty. 4

for automatic

Li: ke tjhe Bank r uptcy Co~ -rh e

~-r~
~ t Alooked

to the text of the Connecticut statute to

determine whether Robinson's probation condition was
"compensation for actual pecuniary loss" within the
meaning of §523(a) (7).

But where the Bankruptcy Court had

~._
Cl-~~
considered the entire state probation s
, ' the Seeond
_L,-.-..r:~~
~ t focused only on the w~ d~ that allowed a

"

restitution order to be assessed "for the loss or damage
caused [by the crime]," Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a-30(a) (4).

4The requirement that creditors object to discharge is
limited on its face to paragraphs (2), (4), and (6) of
§523(a). Because paragraph 7 is not listed there, debts
described
in
that
paragraph
are
automatically
nondischargeable, under the general rule prescribed in the
opening clause of §523 (a) (providing that a "discharge
under section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an
individual debtor from any debt" listed in the paragraphs
that follow) .

?

14.

~
The SecoHd

C i retii ~ thought

~

this

language compelled

the conclusion that the probation condition was
"compensation for actual pecuniary loss."

It held,

therefore, that this particular condition of Robinson's
probation was not protected by discharge by §523(a) (7).
--- A

~~e,
d, h . .
1t reverse t e D1str1ct

Court.

~ .. u~

'\ /!:.;';;.r::;:;, 7J. ::;;_

,,_ ~~;;:

Jlll.~~
~

a writ of certiorari,

~icb

:::i: :~g

toS:

~rented.

""

w petition for

We have

W'-r

d/ ,-z..._ <Jftr( ~/.1...

~

jurisdiction to review the .keend Ci-r cuit'• judgment under

~~[N
$~

28

~~
~~..:...

: ; vt-v--

u.s.c.

§1254(1).

W,JJ...

~

..

.1\

~

~.~~

~~~

II.

c..~.,_.-.'
(/'-~ ~
(")t..CJ.t..The

S~~~it's

decision focused

~

on the language of the §§101 and 523 of the

15.

Code.

As JUSTICE

We think that approac

O'CONNOR explained last term, "In expounding a statute, we

7

must not be guided by a single sentence or

~ember

of a

sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and
'7

to its objectW:nd policy."

Offshore Logistics, Inc. v.

A

Tallentire, 477

u.s.

__,

(1986}

(quoting Mastro

Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 350 U.S.
270, 285 ( 1956}

(quoting United States v. Heirs of

Boisdore, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849)}).

<::A

S eeond-~ i rCJ.l it

~~~
~~;>

In this case, the

~ ~l.ft.L

accord'\

app~~ia~e

weight either to

the history of bankruptcy court deference to criminal
judgments or to the interests of the States in unfettered

~

administration of their criminal justice systems.

A

16.

The present text of Title 11, commonly referred
to as the Bankruptcy Code, was enacted in

1978 ~eplace

the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat.

544.~

!)

The

treatment of criminal judgments under the Act informs our
understanding of its replacement.

18fi

The Act's treatment of
A

~-

debts calls to mind medieval disputations on the nature of
the Trinity.

w(IT.V/
~

t:..tJ~~
~l

A general outline of that treatment,

tf-Ahowever, is sufficient for our purposes.
of an
"allowable" debt.
ed. 1977)

See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy

~57

(14th

(describing the requirements and procedures for

17.

allowance of a claim).

Only if a debt was allowable could

the creditor receive a share of the bankrupt's assets.
See §65a.

For this case, it is important to note that

§57j excluded from the class of allowable debts penalties
owed to government entities.

That section provided:

Debts owing to the United States, a State, a
county, a district, or a municipality as a
penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed,
except for the amount of the pecuniary loss
sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding
out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose.
30 Stat., at 561.

1.
"'

Hv-1 ~((8
Second, §63 established the separate concept of a
"provable" debt.
ed. 1975).

See 3A Collier on Bankruptcy

~63

(14th

Section 17 provided that a discharge in

bankruptcy "release[d] a bankrupt from all of his provable

......

~

debts," subject to several exceptions . listed in later

18.

portions of §17.

Although §17 specifically excepted four

types of debts from discharge, it did not mention criminal
penalties
of _
any
kind.
__
__
_
___..l

~The

most natural construction ef

tA~t

would

have allowed criminal penalties to be discharged in
bankruptcy, even though the government was not entitled to
a share of the bankrupt's estate.

Congress had considered

~~y

criminal penalties when it passed the Act; it

""

made them nonallowable.

The failure expressly to make

them nondischargeable at the same time offered substantial

~

support eo the

~
~n that the Act discharged those

"
penalties.

li7%

But the courts did not interpret the Act in this

"

way.

Despite the clear statutory language, most courts

refused to allow a discharge in bankruptcy to affect the

19.

judgment of a state criminal court.

In the leading case,

the district judge reasoned:

It might be admitted that sections 63 and 17 of
the bankrupt act, if only the letter of those
provisions be looked to, would embrace [criminal
penalties]; but it is well settled that there
may be cases in which such literal construction
is not admissible • • • • It may suffice to say
that nothing but a ruling from a higher court
would convince me that congress, by any
provision of the bankrupt act, intended to
permit the discharge, under its operations, of
any judgment entered by a state or federal court
imposing a fine in the enforcement of criminal
laws • . . . The provisions of the bankrupt act
have reference alone to civil liabilities, as
demands between debtor and creditors, as such,
and not to punishment inflicted pro bono publico
for crimes committed." In re Moore, 111 F. 145,
148-49 (W.D. Ky. 1901).

This reasoning was sufficiently accepted by the time
~4..(.

~

c.-. I 778

Congres \ QJ:"aft.ed theACode that a leading commentator could
state flatly that "fines and penalties are not affected by

20.

a discharge."
1609-10

&

See lA Collier on Bankruptcy

~17.13,

at

n.lO {14th ed. 1979).
Moreover, those few courts faced with restitution

obligations imposed as part of criminal sentences applied
this reasoning to prevent a discharge in bankruptcy from
affecting such a condition of a criminal sentence.

~

instance, four years before

For

~M-~~

Congres ~

peeeee t!Ae.l\ Code, the

New York Supreme Court stated:

A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect
whatsoever upon a condition of restitution of a
criminal sentence. A bankruptcy proceeding is
civil in nature and is intended to relieve an
honest and unfortunate debtor of his debts and
to permit him to begin his financial life anew.
A condition of restitution in a sentence of
probation is a part of the judgment of
conviction. It does not create a debt nor a
debtor/creditor relationship between the persons
making and receiving restitution. As with any
other condition of a probationary sentence it is
intended as a means to insure the defendant will
lead a law-abiding life thereafter. State v.

21.

~

Mosesson, 78 Misc. 2d 217, ???, 356 N.Y.S.2d
483, 484 (S. Ct. 1974) (citations omitted). 7

~
Thus, Congress enacted the Code in 1978 against

a.-,~~
the background ofAt judicial exception to discharge for
criminal sentences, including restitution orders, an
exception created in the face of a statute drafted with
considerable care and specificity.

B

~~J...../,.....~~1
?For similar decision ¥
see State ex rel. Auerbach v.
Topping Bros., 79 Misc. 2d 260, 359 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987-88
(Crim. Ct. 1974); State v. Washburn, 97 Cal. App. 3d 621,
625-26, 158 Cal. Rptr. 822, 825 (1979).

22.

L~ur interpretation of the Code also must conside

(
the basis for this judicial exception, a deep conviction
that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate

th~ 

results of state criminal proceedings. {YThe right to
formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an important
aspect of the sovereignty retained by the States.

This

Court has emphasized repeatedly "the fundamental policy
against federal interference with state criminal
prosecutions."

Younger v. Harris, 401

In the opinion of the

S~~nd Ci~it,

u.s.

37, 46 (1971).

it was acceptable

that Connecticut officials could have ensured continued
enforcement of their court's criminal judgment against
Robinson by objecting to discharge under §523(c).
approach has several problems.

This

r

A--r-?~~

rP' ~r

x:r

·-~~;r

,J- ~f

.J.I·

23.

/r -

require state prosecutors to

1l___/

reprove the elements of the crime to the satisfaction of
the bankruptcy judge.

As JUSTICE BRENNAN has noted,

~

federal adjudication of matters already at l ssue in state

/\

(

criminal proceedings can be "an unwarranted and unseemly
duplication of the State's own adjudicative process."
Perez v. Ledesma, 401

u.s. 82, 121 (1971) (opinion of

BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).8
Second, as Robinson's attorney conceded at oral
argument, some restitution orders would not be protected

8Robinson argues that the burden on the state would not
always be imposing.
In many cases, principles of issue
preclusion might obviate the need for relitigation of
factual questions in the bankruptcy court.
But this
explanation is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First
of all, differences between the elements of crimes and the
provisions of §523 often may complicate the application of
issue preclusion. Moreover, the complexity of proceedings
in the bankruptcy courts, and the attendant diversion of
prosecutorial effort, is not our only concern. We must
also consider
the
unseemliness of
requiring
state
prosecutors to submit the judgments of their criminal
courts to federal bankruptcy judges.

24.

from discharge even if the State did object to discharge.
For example, a criminal judge in a negligent homicide case
might sentence the defendant to probation, conditioned on
the defendant's paying the victim's

~ompensation

for the loss the husband sustained when the defendant
killed his wife.

It is not clear that such a restitution

order would fit the terms of any of the exceptions to
discharge listed in §523 other than §523(a) (7).

Thus,

this interpretation of the Code would do more than force
state prosecutors to defend state criminal judgments in
federal bankruptcy court.

Inevitably it would lead to

federal remission of judgments imposed by state criminal
judges.
This prospect, in turn, would hamper the
flexibility of state criminal judges in choosing the

25.

combination of imprisonment, fines, and restitution most
likely to further rehabilitation of the defendant.
~ UII-H4-'

Restitution is a particularly effective

~1

for
lL~""

rehabilitation because it forces the defendant to
confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have

such an order to a fine, paid to an abstract and

~

impersonal entity like the State, and calculated without
I\

regard to the harm the defendant has caused.9
Robinson attempts to minimize this problem by
arguing that state prosecutors and criminal judges need
only consult the provisions of the federal Bankruptcy Code

9see Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process:
A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 9 31, 9 3 7-41
(1984).

.

26.

before selecting the appropriate sentence.
contention misses the point entirely.

This

We are not troubled

by requirements that state officials understand and apply
federal law.

But we will not lightly limit the

rehabilitative options available to state criminal judges.
In cases raising close questions of dischargeability under
the Bankruptcy Code, those judges would be put to a harsh
choice:

impose the sentence that best suits the interests

of the state criminal process, and hope that the federal
courts will not disturb that

judgment~

or forgo imposition

of a restitution order to ensure continued enforcement of
some criminal judgment.
In short, we believe that the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the Code would entail grave interferenc
in the core of the state criminal process.

27.

c.

In light of the pre-Code judicial exception, and
the interests of the States, we should hesitate before
concluding that a discharge in bankruptcy can operate to
remit a state criminal sentence.

As

caref~ ~

a

~~

a~

interpretation of regulatory statutes that infringed upon

The task is one of accommodation as between
assertions of new federal authority and historic
functions of the individual states. Federal
legislation of this character cannot therefore
be construed without regard to the implications
of our dual system of government • • • . The
underlying assumptions of our dual form of
government, and the consequent presuppositions
of legislative draftsmanship which are
expressive of our history and habits, cut across
what might otherwise be the implied range of
legislation. The history of congressional
legislation ••• justif[ies] the generalization
that, when the Federal Government takes over
such local radiations in the vast network of our

28.

~

national economic enterprise and thereby
radically readjusts the balance of state and
national authority, those charged with the duty
of legislating ~are reasonably explicit.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 539-40 (1947).

Similarly, the Court has explained that

frequently words of general meaning are used in
a statute, words broad enough to include an act
in question, and yet a consideration of the
whole legislation, or of the circumstances
surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd
results which follow from giving such broad
meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to
believe that the legislator intended to include
the particular act. Church of the Holy Trinity
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).

29.

~

the ~Bankruptcy

Code silently abrogated exceptions created

by courts construing the old

~ance,

9-nst

B~fl ~ u~tov

Act.

~

1 ast term, J n Midlantic National Bank v.

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474
U.S.

(1986), a trustee in bankruptcy asked us to hold

that ~

i~

had implicitly repealed

H-e_
exception to the trustee's

~

1\

abandonment power.

Courts had created that exception out

of deference to state health and safety

~

regulatio~

t::-el'l~~~:t,..JH.~~ 4+-1- ~ ~ I.e
the States' interest in

ce~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~

administering their criminal justice systems.

~---b~~~~~~~~, ~

stated:

tn

respons ~

. (

30.

The normal rule of statutory construction is
that if Congress intends for legislation to
change the interpretation of a judicially
created concept, it makes that intent specific.
The Court has followed this rule with particular
care in construing the scope of bankruptcy
codifications. If Congress wishes to grant the
trustee an extraordinary exemption from nonbankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly
expressed, not left to be collected or inferred
from disputable considerations of convenience in
administering the estate of the bankrupt." 474
u.s., at ___ (quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S.
441, 444 (1904)) (citations omitted).

This tradition of flexibly interpreting the text

abuJ

of Congress's bankruptcy statutes rests on the equitable

"
nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction.

In one of our cases

interpreting the Act, Justice Douglas remarked:

"[W]e do

not read these statutory words with the ease of a
computer.

There is an overriding consideration that

equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy
jurisdiction."
(1966).

Bank of Marin v. England, 385

u.s.

This Court has recognized that the States'

99, 103

31.

interest in administering their criminal justice systems
free from federal interference is one of the most powerful
of the considerations that should influence a court
considering

tn~ ~~

of

equitabl~~ef.

-

A

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).

See Younger

~~o-f~

ThisA ~~eion JRUtJt ~.

influence our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in
this case.

III.

In light of the long pre-Code tradition
precluding bankruptcy courts from affecting criminal
judgments, we have

~

~£a~e

""

doubts whether Congress intended

to make criminal penalties "debts" within the meaning of

~~

32.

§101(4).10

But we need not address that question in this

case, because we hold that §523(a) (7) preserves from
discharge any condition a state criminal court imposes as
part of a criminal sentence.
The relevant portion of §523 (a) (7) preserves any
debt

to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty,
or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of
a governmental unit, and is not compensation for
actual pecuniary loss.

~ Uc.<- c.vw.,.,r

~at

vt ~

~

lOwe recognize
the Code's definition of "debt" is
broadly drafted, and that the legislative history supports
a broad reading of the definition.
But nothing in the
legislative history swM-·EHi~el-i1l4J' ~bis f3l'OYh!lton suggests
that Congress intended to change the state of the law with
respect to criminal judgments.

/

33.

This

language,(~.~~~~m.';~/...~

~ ,;z;._ fa.-< 4 -~ S 52 3La...)(7) ~fa. •• :t., ~ ~f ~
~ discharge in bankruptcy voids restitution orders imposed
~
~
~ 4tr!~...,.~

as conditions of probation by state courts.

Nowhere in

4

~c4

H..A.-/---.
the House and Senate Reports, nor in either of the leading
treatises, is there any indication that this language

-t.L ~,.. .,L- ~ ~ ..
should h.:we such aR iRtrua iu9 -Qffeot.

~k-1\e/,,1. 4

A.~oYght

thcrt §523 (a)

'(1 If

Congress had

, ~~ ~~~' .tc ~
(7) ~ Q4.g ~

:p.r-m.zi..Qs full pratectioR to

~~
state criminal sentences, "we can be certain that there
1\

llFor the section-by-section analysis in the legislative
reports, see H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 363
(1977); s. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 79 (1978).
For explanations of the section by commentators, see 3
Collier on Bankruptcy 11523.17 (15th ed. 1986); 1 Norton
Bankruptcy Law and Practice §27.37 (1981).
In fact, both
of these commentators expressly state that the language
should not have the intrusive effect sought by Robinson.
See Collier, 11523.17, at 523-123 n.4; Norton, §27.37, at
55 n.2.
We acknowledge that a few stray comments in the
hearings and the Bankruptcy Laws Commission Report may
suggest that the language bears the interpretation adopted
by the Second Circuit.
But none of those statements was
made by a member of Congress. Nor is there any indication
to that effect in the official reports cited above.
We
decline to accord such extraordinary weight to such
statements.

34.

would have been hearings, testimony, and debate concerning
consequences so wasteful, so inimical to purposes
previously deemed important, and so likely to arouse
public outrage," Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 209 (1978)

(POWELL, J. , dissenting) •

We read this language
SecoRd

Ci~ctlit.

~

differently

~e

On its face, it creates a broad exception

(\,

for all penal sanctions, whether they be denominated
fines, penalties, or forfeitures.
qualifying phrases:

Congress included two

the fines must be both "to and for

the benefit of a governmental unit," and "not compensation
for pecuniary loss."

I t... wonld

he =~

this section does not protect traditional criminal

~~
~

~
,.
,,

fines.~

We must decide whether the result is altered by the two
major differences between restitution and a traditional

)(

('S -u_
~ 1-

(J~~)

35.

fine:
penalty

the penalty is forwarded to the victim, and

the

~.L...
calculated by reference to the amount of
.1\

~

harm the offender has

caused ~ 523(a)

(7) codified the

In our view, neither of these clauses allows the

Hc.A-f-~ ~~ rl ~k~

discharge of a criminal judgment.
1\

We think Congress added

the qualifications to ensure that the exception was not
improperly extended beyond the penal context that
justified the exception.

This interpretation rests on the

legislative development of §523 (a) (7), the broader
framework of the Code, and the nature of restitution.

7

1--

A.

36.

The first draft of what eventually became the
Bankruptcy Code was presented to Congress in 1973 by the
Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.
House Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess (Comm'n Rep.).
Two sections of that draft changed the Act's treatment of
fines and penalties.

First, §4-506 (a) (9) of that draft,

the predecessor of Code §523(a) (7), codified the
judicially created exception to dischargeability.
Specifically, it excepted from discharge "any liability to
the extent it is for a fine for the benefit of a federal,
state, or local government."12

"fo~th~e+:ef

12The language
it of a governmental unit"
is apparently a re ormulation of the language of §57j of
the old Act, wl:tie+t applied to debts "owing to the United
States, a State; a county, a district, or a municipality."
30 Stat., at 561. The note to this section explained that
the section was intended to "clarify and rationalize the
dischargeabili ty status of debts for nonpecuniary loss,
i.e. , debts for fines, penal ties, or forfeitures or for
multiple, punitive, or exemplary damages."
Comm' n Rep.,
(Footnote continued)

37.

The second relevant section was 4-406(a) (3), the

J-h:;._/predecessor of Code §726(a) (4),

~subordinated

1'\

payment

of "any claim, whether secured or unsecured, to the extent
it is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture or for multiple,
punitive, or exemplary damages."

As the Commission's note

explained, this section was a reformulation of §57j of the
old Act,

~f
had completely disallowed fines.

w~

The

-1

Commission changed §57j in two major respects.

First, by

providing for subordination instead of disallowance, it
allowed payment "in the rare case in which all allowed and
unsubordinated claims are paid in full."

Second, it

(Footnote 12 continued from previous page)
pt. 2, at 141. This note supports an inference that the
"for the benefit of a governmental unit" restriction was
designed to distinguish between penal sanctions and
ordinary punitive damages, limiting the benefits of
nondischargeability to penal sanctions.

38.

removed "the limitation in §57j to debts owing to a
governmental unit."

See Comm'n Rep., pt. 2, at 116.

These two sections of the Commission's draft
provided a coherent treatment for obligations in this
area.

The old Act, and its judicial glossjS, rendered

penalties owed to the government disallowable and
nondischargeable.

Under the new bill, penalties owed to

the government would continue to be nondischargeable.

But

those penalties would no longer be completely

I-~""'> ~1-

disallowable.

Instead they would be subordinated.

As the

Commission explained, debtors in bankruptcy who have
sufficient funds to pay ordinary creditors gain an
unjustified windfall if they are not forced to pay fines
as well.

~

39.

'J

1

~~t-1

u-Ul..

I

But the Commission retained the Act's reasoning
/\.

that, where the creditor's interest is more penal than
compensatory, he has a reduced interest in payment.
Because this reasoning applies equally well to punitive
damages, the Commission recommended that punitive damage •
/.

~

';;)

~~~, The close connection between these sections leads to the

f..~·

~-

..

conclusion that the language in §4-406 subord1nat1ng
"punitive and exemplary damages" should be construed as
the converse of the phrase in §4-506 preventing discharge
of debts "for the benefit of" a governmental unit.

Thus,

the limitation of nondischargeability relief to fines
assessed "for the benefit of a federal, state, or local
government" was inserted only to ensure that punitive
damages would not receive the benefit of
nondischargeability.

This language, with slight

v

40.

modifications, remains in the current text of section
523 (a) (7).
Similarly, the reference to "compensation for
actual pecuniary loss" was not designed to effect the
discharge of state criminal judgments.

This language did

not appear in the Commission's draft, but was added later.
The House Report offers no explanation
insertion of this phrase.

wh ~ ee?er

for the

The Senate Report offers a

.2.
brief, though unclear, explanation:

Paragraph (7) makes nondischargeable certain
liabilities for penalties •••• These ••.
liabilities cover those which, but are penal in
nature [sic], as distinct from so-called
"pecuniary loss" penalties which, in the case of
taxes, involve basically the collection of a tax
under the label of a "penalty." S. Rep. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 79 (1978).

41.

This statement indicates that the main concern of Congress
in this area was to clarify the dischargeability of tax

,

penalties.

A common problem

ue,L

~e~t

had been

J'\

attempts to disguise penalties on tax payments by labeling
them as interest.

If the payments were "interest" instead

~~1~
of "penalties," they would be allowable under section 57j.
'\

See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ,15 7. 22 [ 2 .1]

{14th ed. 1979) •

~

The new Code codified a benefit previously found only in
1\

case-law.

Apparently, Congress wanted to discourage

manipulation of this provision by attachment of the formal
label "penalty" to payments "which, in the case of taxes,

42.

involve basically the collection of a tax under the label
of a 'penalty.•nl3

B.

A broader examination of the Code's treatment of
debts owed to governments demonstrates the logic of this
interpretation.

As we have explained above, government

debts are generally allowable under the Code.

When the

government's interest is like that of a creditor, the Code
gives the government a first priority of payment, see

13 The Code's prov1s1ons establishing priority of payment
for tax penalties mirror this treatment.
In §507, -w.Ricb- ~
ranks
various
claims
receiving
priority
in
the
distribution of assets, Congress granted a priority to
certain tax penalties, §507 (a) (6) (G).
In defining the
preferred penalties, Congress used exactly the language-"compensation for actual pecuniary loss"--§523(a) (7) uses
to limit dischargeability.

43.

§726(a) (1), but does not protect the debt from discharge.
~

When the government 1 s interest is penal, A Ure government 1 s y-main interest is not in receiving compensation, but in
punishing or rehabilitating the debtor.

Thus, the Code

subordinates payment of these debts in §726(a) (4), but

~ exempts

them from discharge under §523(a) {7).

Nothing in this framework mandates, or even counsels, an
exception that would treat restitution imposed as a
condition of probation any differently from other types of
criminal sentences.

c.

Finally, consideration of the nature of these
restitution orders shows that the language of §523(a) (7)

44.

can be understood to prevent discharge.
•

justice system is not

The criminal

I

operated ~efit
A.

but for the benefit of society as a whole.

of victims,

Thus, it is

concerned not only with punishing the offender, but also
with rehabilitating him.

Although restitution does

resemble a judgment "for the benefit of" the victim, the
context in which it is imposed undermines that conclusion .

control over the amount of restitution

~ be a ~

~ over the decision to award restitution.

Second. the

1

-1

decision to impose restitution generally does not rest on
the victim's needs for compensation, but on the penal
goals of the State and the situation of the defendant.
This point is well illustrated by

~*~

th ~ statute

at

~--

~ ~H.A--~~;(,.&,1~~ ~
t\}~e.

~authorizes

~~A-~

a judge

45.

imposing a sentence of probation to impose any of eight
specified conditions, as well as "any other conditions
reasonably related to his rehabilitation."
Stat. §53a-30 (a) (9).

Conn. Gen.

Clause (4) of that section

authorizes a judge to require that the defendant

make restitution of the fruits of his offense or
make restitution, in an amount he can afford to
pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the
loss or damage caused thereby and the court may
fix the amount thereof and the manner of
performance.

o.~~ ~t

T"L~
~~ ~ ~ is

~ ~·
~ ~

..~,v
r -·
;~

~~
·~

~~?·
1/'A-

clause does not discuss the needs or desires of the

~~~~~-

victim ] ~~

~

require imposition of restitution in

the amount of the harm caused.

Instead, it provides for a

46.

Because criminal proceedings focus on the State's
interests in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than
the victim's desire for compensation, we conclude that
restitution orders imposed in such proceedings operate
"for the benefit of" the State.

Similarly, they are not

assessed "for .•• compensation" of the victim.

~ ~ ~e sentence

a criminalj -trlcri-. ~~

necessarily considers the penal and rehabilitative
interests of the state. 14

Those interests are sufficient

to place restitution orders within the

~
~t

of §523Ca) (7).

14 This is not the only context in which courts have been
forced to evaluate the treatment of restitution orders by
determining whether they were "compensatory" or "penal."
Several lower courts have addressed the constitutionality
of the federal Victim Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.
§3579. Under that Act, defendants have no right to jury
trial as to the amount of restitution, even though the
Seventh Amendment would require such a trial if the issue
were decided in a civil case. See NOte, The Right to a
Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982, 63 Texas L. Rev. 671
(1984). Every federal circuit court that has considered
(Footnote continued)

47.

IV.

of the

o~eFw~elmi~

interests the States

administering their state criminal justice systems
without interference from the bankruptcy courts, we are
unwilling to assume that Congress intended to discharge
conditions of probation through the oblique reference in
§523(a) (7).

An alternate result would "force Congress

into otherwise unnecessary action by interpreting a
statute to produce a result no one intended," Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, 437
(JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting).

u.s.

153, 211 (1978)

We hold that section

(Footnote 14 continued from previous page)
the question has concluded that criminal defendants
contesting the assessment of restitution orders are not
entitled to the protections of the Seventh Amendment. See
id., at 672 n.l8 (citing cases).

15.

)
Logistics, Inc. v. Tallent ire, 4 77 U.S. ____/ __ ( 1986)
(quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 350

u.s.

270, 285 (1956)
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criminal

to the history of bankruptcy cour
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case, ( the Court of Appeals accorded

the States in unfettered
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8 How. 113, 122 (1849))).
..

~

(quoting United States v.

criminal justice systems.
~
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fA

The present text of Title 11, commonly referred
to as the Bankruptcy Code, was enacted in 1978 to replace

16.

the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. 5
of I~C\ S
treatment of criminal judgments under the

The

Act~ informs

our

tk '~"""e..~ ~ c.o~ ... --- - - - - - - - - - understanding of its replaoeme~t. The 1898 Act's

1"h(.. :f\l~t: ~

treatment of debts calls to mind medieval disputations on

v-Jo-.J\.J

s "'-/
.\--\1\is.

the nature of the Trinity

Vll.A't-\

[You can pull this if you like,

The Justice's comment was "Wow!
1\.

F

Ask your co-clerks

general otltline of that

treatmeR ~

lmwe:::ore b. , is sufficient for our purposes •..ct~.f ..\-N. ~

Ad o ~ k4 1,...6
First, §57 (established the co.ocQ.Pt of an,..,__,

w
"allowable" deb1 .
ed. 1977)

c:.e.h':lt,-...1

See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ,157 (14th

(aescr ibing the requ-i-f.ements aad-f?-r ecedttres fo-r

5congress amended the Bankruptcy Act several times
between 1898 and 1978.
Congress also made numerous
technical changes to the Code in the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 380.
None of those changes is relevant to this
decision.

17.

~ llowa11ce

of a claim) .

Only if a debt was allowable could

the creditor receive a share of the bankrupt's assets.
See §65a.

For this case, it is important to note that

§57j excluded from the class of allowable debts penalties
owed to government entities.

'

That section provided:

Debts owing to the United States, a State, a
county, a district, or a municipality as a
penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed,
except for the amount of the pecuniary loss
sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding
out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose.
30 Stat., at 561.

Second, §63 established the separate
•provable"

ed. 1975).

deb~

i

c...~~i>r"
cocc~t

of aJ--

See 3A Collier on Bankruptcy ,163 (14th

Section 17 provided that a discharge in

bankruptcy "release[d] a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts," subject to several exceptions listed in later

18.

portions of §17.

Although §17 specifically excepted four

types of debts from discharge, it did not mention criminal
penalties of any kind.

The most natural construction of

~rtr~~o•~

the Act l would have allowed criminal penalties to be

•

discharged in bankruptcy, even though the government was
not entitled to a share of the bankrupt's estate.
Congress had considered criminal penalties when it passed
the Act; it clearly made them nonallowable.

~

The failure

expressly to make them nondischargeable at the same time
offered substantial support for the view that the Act
discharged those penalties.
But the courts did not interpret the 1898 Act in
this way.

Despite the clear statutory language, most

courts refused to allow a discharge in bankruptcy to

19.

affect the judgment of a state criminal court.

In the

reur~

leading case, the

d i~errct

}udse reasoned:

It might be admitted that sections 63 and 17 of
the bankrupt act, if only the letter of those
provisions be looked to, would embrace [criminal
penalties]~ but it is well settled that there
may be cases in which such literal construction
is not admissible . . . • It may suffice to say
that nothing but a ruling from a higher court
would convince me that congress, by any
provision of the bankrupt act, intended to
permit the discharge, under its operations, of
any judgment entered by a state or federal court
imposing a fine in the enforcement of criminal
laws . • . . The provisions of the bankrupt act
have reference alone to civil liabilities, as
demands between debtor and creditors, as such,
and not to punishment inflicted pro bono publico
~------~~~~~~~committed."
In re Moore, 111 F. 145,
Ky. 19 01) •
6Although courts differed as to the boundaries of the
exception, particularly in cases involving nonmonetary
sanctions, or sanctions imposed in civil proceedings, the
reasoning of Moore was widely accepted. See, e.g., Parker
v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 71 (CAl 1946) (citing Moore
and noting that " [ i] t was not in the contemplation of
Congress that the federal bankruptcy power should be
employed to pardon a bankrupt from the consequences of a
criminal offense")~ Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F.2d 110, 116
(CA2 1967) (citing Moore and stating that "governmental
sanctions are not regarded as debts even when they require
monetary payments"). We have found only one federal court
decision allowing a discharge in bankruptcy to affect a
sentence imposed by a criminal court.
In re Alderson, 98
F. 588 ~~ · 1899).

~1'&\ \

l

'V'1\f

0..-..,j

WO<y ~

20.

This reasoning was sufficiently accepted by the time
Congress enacted the new Code that a leading commentator
could state flatly that "fines and penalties are not
affected by a discharge."

See lA Collier on Bankruptcy

·
th ose f ew cour t s f ace d w1t

l~

J,...

?

U7. 1 3, at 1609-10 & n.lO (14th_

~~~.
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h~
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·
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imposed as pa rt o f o~ bm i na ± sen t enc

applied ~~

s~~

reasoning to prevent a discharge in bankruptcy from
affecting such a condition of a criminal sentence.

For

instance, four years before Congress enacted the Code, the
York Supreme Court stated:

A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect
whatsoever upon a condition of restitution of a
criminal sentence. A bankruptcy proceeding is

{~ ~~ 1-
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civil in nature and is intended to relieve an
honest and unfortunate debtor of his debts and
to permit him to begin his financial life anew.
A condition of restitution in a sentence of
probation is a part of the judgment of
conviction. It does not create a debt nor a
debtor/creditor relationship between the persons
making and receiving restitution. As with any
other condition of a probationary sentence it is
intended as a means to insure the defendant will
lead a law-abiding life thereafter. State v.
Mosesson,
·
, 356 N.Y.S.2d
483, 484 ( 974)
omitted). 7

Thus, Congress enacted the Code in 1978 against
the background of an established judicial exception to
discharge for criminal sentences, including restitution
orders, an exception created in the face of a statute
drafted with considerable care and specificity.

B

7

£"'-r-~JoU.I...I.GI""--4l~:...L.:;~:tn"'::t-

se

~359
t e ex r e 1 . Aue r bach v.
N.Y.S.2d 985, 987-88

~~~~~~~0,

(Footnote continued)
I
7 _1.
~ra·J=Lc,h< !Als .

22.

interpretation of
the basis for this judicial exception, a deep conviction
that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the
results of state criminal proceedings.

The right to

formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an important
aspect of the sovereignty retained by the States.

This

Court has emphasized repeatedly "the fundamental policy
against federal interference with state criminal
prosecutions."
~

•·6-d

Younger v. Harris, 401

u.s. 37, 46 (1971).
{.()It\(,

l \) J t-J

~ ~ n Lh~ opini-on of the Court of Appeals ,_, it was acceptabi~

that Connecticut officials could have ensured continued
enforcement of their court's criminal judgment against

~

(Footnote 7 continued from previous page)
(Crim. Ct. 1974); State v. Washburn, 97 Cal. App. 3d 621,
625-26, 158 Cal. Rptr. 822, 825 (1979).

23.

s~Jl

-r

-t\~ ¥

'f.~~
Robinson by objecting to discharge under §523(c).
(JJr-,
~ ._
-.......
,~~""6 v-•.•;v
.,t.,L\W
~ n+<! ' • I • \ 4
•
L' Co
L
~r-l- sv
""'. ,_c:~a: f'J b a ~~ \Msc. .... ~,c-L"t"Orj fo~"" ~~....1 ,.-c._"'~o"'"Sd"-~:.:.o.-~b - -= »eug r a l prob f e ms.

First, it would require state prosecutors to
defend state criminal judgments before the federal
bankruptcy courts.a

As JUSTICE BRENNAN has noted, federal

adjudication of matters already at issue in state criminal
proceedings can be "an unwarranted and unseemly
duplication of the State's own adjudicative process."

s\; ~h""
ttf+t.v-8Robinson argues / that the bur
the state l would not
always be i J1iposi ng.
In man
principles of issue
preclusion might obviate t e need for relitigation of
factual questions in the
ankruptcy court.
Bo t ~is
~t

between the elements of crimes and the
provisions of §523
may c OatfJlica ~ e application o
issue preclusion. Moreover, the complexity of procee d 1ng~~
in the bankruptcy courts, and the attendant diversion of
·V\)'flt1
prosecutorial effort, is not our only concern. We must
also consider
the
unseemliness
of
requiring
state
prosecutors to submit the judgments of their criminal
courts to federal bankruptcy judges.
of

a~ ,

~ifferences

24.

Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 121 (1971)

(opinion of

BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).9
Second, as Robinson's attorney conceded at oral
argument, some restitution orders would not be protected
~Y~(Io.,- ~J e;v-k O.V"' ~'»b,)e".Y~o .....-..
from discharge even if the State did l~;eet to discharge.
For example, a criminal judge in a negligent homicide case
might sentence the defendant to probation, conditioned on
the defendant's paying the victim's husband compensation
for the loss the husband sustained when the defendant
killed his wife.

It is not clear that such a restitution

9of
course,
federal
courts
often
duplicate
state
adjudicative processes when they consider petitions for
the writ of habeas corpus. But explicit reference in the
Constitution, Art. I, §9, cl. 2, as well as ~ $c-v«"c.'
federal statutes, testify to the importance of the writ of
"""' habeas corpus • i n e f'lsur i ng t ha t Sta tes comp l y w H:h-t ~
~
fede r a l
eo ns t itnt i~ .
l-n th i s e ase,
the case for
relitigat i on in the federal courts res s only on the
ambiguous words of the Bankruptcy Code.

25.

order would fit the terms of any of the exceptions to
discharge listed in §523 other than §523(a) (7).

Thus,

this interpretation of the Code would do more than force
state prosecutors to defend state criminal judgments in
federal bankruptcy court.

Inevitably it would lead to

federal remission of judgments imposed by state criminal
judges.
This prospect, in turn, would hamper the
flexibility of state criminal judges in choosing the
combination of imprisonment, fines, and restitution most
likely to further rehabilitation of the defendant.
Restitution is a particularly effective means for
rehabilitation because it forces the defendant to
confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have
caused.

Trial judges often prefer such an order to a

26.

t~~
-+te St'e:--te..

P- 3

fine, paid to ( an abstract and impersonal entity
~ S ta.te ,

1~

and

Robinson attempts
arguing that state prosecutors and

~~ ~ '2·

~~~ .('-\ ~

.r-0' ,~If'
~ ~J

only consult the provisions of

the~ l

before selecting the appropriate sentence.
contention misses the point entirely.

Bankruptcy
This

We are not troubled

by requirements that state officials understand and apply
federal law.

But we will not lightly limit the
~ ~ a~~t
rehabilitative options available to state criminal judges.

..

(

In cases raising close questions of dischargeability under

27.

the Bankruptcy Code, those judges would be put to a harsh
choice:

impose the sentence that best suits the interests

of the state criminal process, and hope that the federal
courts will not disturb that judgment; or forgo imposition
of a restitution order to ensure continued enforcement of
some criminal judgment ~
In short, the Court of Appeals' 'nterpretation of
the Code would entail substantial interference in the
state criminal process.

Iu l ight of the pre Code judicial elf'cepti en-;--a-nd
the interests of trre States,

\Ole

shoa:td he-sitate bef..o.r..e

corrclading tl'rat a d1scharge 1n ban ruptcy-can oper-ate-

~

~

t~
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1 as t term we

=.

:s

declined to hold that the new Bankruptcy Code silently
abrogated exceptions created by courts construing the old
Act.

In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department

of Environmental Protection, 474

u.s.

(1986), a

trustee in bankruptcy asked us to hold that the 1978 Code
had implicitly repealed an exception to the trustee's
abandonment power.

Courts had created that exception out

of deference to state health and safety regulations, a
consideration comparable to the States' interests
implicated by this case.

We stated:

The normal rule of statutory construction is
that if Congress intends for legislation to
change the interpretation of a judicially

29.

created concept, it makes that intent specific.
The Court has followed this rule with particular
care in construing the scope of bankruptcy
codifications. If Congress wishes to grant the
trustee an extraordinary exemption from nonbankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly
expressed, not left to be collected or inferred
from disputable considerations of convenience in
administering the estate of the bankrupt." 474
u.s., at
(quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 u.s.
441, 444 (1904)) (citations omitted).

-----)

jurisdict~ one of
our cases interpreting the Act, Justice Douglas remarked:
"[W]e do not read these statutory words with the ease of a
computer.

There is an overriding consideration that

equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy
jurisdiction."
(1966).

Bank of Marin v. England, 385

u.s.

99, 103

This Court has recognized that the States'

interest in administering their criminal justice systems

30.

free from federal interference is one of the most powerful
of the considerations that should influence a court
considering equitable types of relief.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).

See Younger v.

This reflection of our

federalism also must influence our interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code in this case. 11

,.a"be-...rc.-J

OPft'Oo-t-'-" t ..

1 1Justice Frankfurter ~avoFe d a similar cau~ieR i n the
interpretation of regulatory statutes that infringe ~ upon
important state interests:
~
The task is one of accommodation as between
assertions of new federal authority and historic
functions of the individual states.
Federal
legislation of this character cannot therefore
be construed without regard to the implications
of our dual system of government.
The
underlying assumptions of our dual form of
government, and the consequent presuppositions
of
legislative
draftsmanship
which
are
expressive of our history and habits, cut across
what might otherwise be the implied range of
legislation.
The
history of congressional
legislation
justif [ ies] the generalization
that, when the Federal Government takes over
such local radiations in the vast network of our
national
economic
enterprise
and
thereby
radically readjusts the balance of state and
national authority, those charged with the duty
of
legislating
are
reasonably
explicit.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
(Footnote continued)
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III.

In light of the long pre-Code tradition

.

~ 14'e.n ""'-'\

precluding bankruptcy courts from

a ffec t~

criminal

judgments, we have serious doubts whether Congress
intended to make criminal penalties "debts" within the
meaning of §101(4) .12

But we need not address that

question in this case, because we hold that §523(a) (7)
preserves from discharge any condition a state criminal
court imposes as part of a criminal sentence.

(Footnote 11 continued from previous page)
Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 539-40 (1947).
12we recognize, as the Court of Appeals emphasized, that
the Code's definition of "debt" is broadly drafted, and
that the legislative history supports a broad reading of
the definition.
But nothing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended to change the state of the
law with respect to criminal judgments.
~
o."v'.....,
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~ ...'Us

J ~~~vr<f-...~
The relevant portion of §523(a) (7) preserves any
0\o.-.

I~

debt

to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty,
or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of
a governmental unit, and is not compensation for
actual pecuniary loss.

This language is subject to interpretation.

On its face,

§523(a) (7) certainly does not compel the conclusion
reached by the Court of Appeals, that a discharge in
bankruptcy voids restitution orders imposed as conditions
of probation by state courts.

Nowhere in the House and

Senate Reports r Ro r in either of the leading
there any indication that this language should be read so

33.

intrusively. l3 If Congress had intended, by §523(a) (7) or
by any other provision, to discharge state criminal
sentences, "we can be certain that there would have been
hearings, testimony, and debate concerning consequences so
wasteful, so inimical to purposes previously deemed
important, and so likely to arouse public outrage,"
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437
(1978)

u.s.

153, 209

(POWELL, J., dissenting).

13For the section-by-section analysis in the legislative
reports, see H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 363
(1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 79 (1978).
For explanations of the section by commentators, see 3
Collier on Bankruptcy 11523.17 (15th ed. 1986); 1 Norton
Bankruptcy Law and Practice §27.37 (1981).
In fact, both
of these commentators expressly state that the language
should not have the intrusive effect sought by Robinson.
See Collier, 11523.17, at 523-123 n.4; Norton, §27.37, at
55 n.2.
We acknowledge that a few stray comments in the
hearings and the Bankruptcy Laws Commission Report may
suggest that the language bears the interpretation adopted
by the Second Circuit.
But none of those statements was
made by a member of Congress, nor were they included in
the official reports cited above.
We decline to accord
any significance to these statements.
See McCaughn v.
Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1931); 2A N.
(Footnote continued)
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We read this language differently than the Second
Circuit.

On its face, it creates a broad exception for

all penal sanctions, whether they be denominated fines,
penalties, or forfeitures.
qualifying phrases;

Congress included two

the fines must be both "to and for

the benefit of a governmental unit," and "not compensation
1'\Mc.- . \~

for pecuniar~ loss."
"'Y"<J ht~ .to

No

'AC*«"e- \i-

i~

o ne has ar~~

l

~~t JS'l-3LC/' )C::t)
that t M& s..e.ct.4on '.i"wj""'~

C.VI(.£()t..l

~

~ess not protee t traditional criminal fines.

I ~ s cle~

1'k ~t'o.\--.Jrl/..;
tha t §52 3 {a) (,_) codifie ~ the judicially . . created exception

"

to discharge for fines.r e must decide whether the result
is altered by the two major

~;3lr:.,.et
a if f e te ~ es
~It:..,..

restitution and a traditional fine:

between

W' I ~\a..-

~~

0"

.

.f,V"' ,

~ rc~r: ..W+,

pefia lty is

(Footnote 13 continued from previous page)
Singer, Sutherland'
Statutory Construction
§48.10, at 319 & n.ll (
984).

.,-
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forwarded to the victim, and

t~

penalty may be

calculated by reference to the amount of harm the offender

(~

7

has caused.@)5 23-i a) (7 ) coatltea
~ excep tion

to a lsch at ge £or fi nes.
In our view, neither of

discharge of a criminal judgment that takes the form of
restitution.

We think Congress added the qualifications

to ensure that the exception was not improperly extended
I)

beyond the penal context that justified the exception.

-

-

-

--------

This interpretation rests on the legislative developme
of §523(a) (7), the broader framework of the Code, and the
nature of restitution.

--·--

36.

The first draft of what eventually became the
Bankruptcy

Commission

~de

was presented to Congress in 1973 by the

of~~

House Doc. No.

Two sections of

Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.

13~ 93d

Cong., 1st Sess (Comm'n Rep.).

that~aft

fines and penalties.

changed the Act's treatment of

Firs\ , §4-506 (a) (9) of that draft,

the predecessor of Code

§523~(7),

judicially created exception to

codified the

~hargeability.

Specifically, it excepted from discha ge "any liability to
the extent it is for a fine for the bene 't of a federal,
state, or local government."l4
The second relevant section was §4-406(a) {3), the
predecessor of Code §726{a) (4), that subordinated payment

1 4 The language "for the benefit of a governmental unit"
is apparently a reformulation of the language of §57j of
the old Act, that applied to debts "owing to the United
{Footnote continued)
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of "any claim, whether secured or unsecured, to the extent
it

i~ for

a fine, penalty, or forfeiture or for multiple,

punitive ) or exemplary damages."

As the Commission's note

explained, this section was a reformulation of §57j of the
7

old Act, that had completely disallowed fines.

The

Commission changed §57j in two major respects.

First, by

providing for subordination instead of disallowance, it
allowed payment "in the rare case in which all allowed and
unsubordinated claims are paid in full."

Second, it

removed "the limitation in §57j to debts owing to a
governmental unit."

See Comm'n Rep ••~ 2, at 116.

(Footnote 14 continued from previous page)
States, a State, a county, a district, or a municipality."
30 Stat., at 561.

38.

These two sections of the Commission's draft

provi ~a
area.

coherent treatment for obligations in this

Th~ld

Act, and its judicial gloss, rendered

penalties owed to the government disallowable and
nondischargeable.

Under the new bill, penalties owed to
\

the government

would~ontinue

to be nondischargeable.

But

\

those penalties would no longer be completely
disallowable.

\

~

Instead they would be subordinated to Lother

secured and unsecured claims.

\

As the Commission

explained, debtors in bankruptcy

WfO

have sufficient funds

to pay ordinary creditors gain an u~~ ustified windfall if
\

they are not forced to pay fines as weli.
But the Commission retained

the~ct's

reasoning

that, where the creditor's interest is more penal than
compensatory, he has a reduced interest in payment.
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Because this reasoning applies equally well to punitive
damages, the Commission recommended that punitive damages
also be subordinated.

The close connection between these

sections leads to the conclusion that the language in §4406 subordinating "punitive and exemplary damages" should
be construed as the converse of the phrase in §4-506
preventing discharge of debts "for the benefit of" a
governmental unit.

Thus, the limitation of

nondischargeability relief to fines assessed "for the
benefit of a federal, state, or local government" was
inserted only to ensure that punitive damages would
1"t.~ C:,""
d~ ScJ"o-''JQ."' blc.
l"!)
·receive the benefit of nond1schargeabii-:i:-t.¥.

This

language, with slight modifications, remains in the
current text of §523 (a) (7).

,,

.

nQt

40.

f milar y, the reference to "compensation for

actual pecuniary loss" was not designed to effect the
discharge of state criminal judgments.

This language did

not appear in the Commission's draft, but was added later.
The House Report offers no explanation for the insertion
of this phrase.

The Senate Report offers a brief, though

unclear, explanation:

Paragraph (7) makes nondischargeable certain
liabilities for penalties •... These •.•
liabilities cover those which, but are penal in
nature [sic], as distinct from so-called
"pecuniary loss" penalties which, in the case of
taxes, involve basically the collection of a tax
under the label of a "penalty." s. Rep. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 79 (1978).

his statement indicates that the main concern of Congress
in this area was to
11'\"'h:..r~-t

penalties)

t

~r'c--ve.-v-.f

c~arify

-h.v

~ '"'~~,:~ o-P .}-~
the dischargeability

Pe.v-c:-lt;t.s 0\.S:

o~

common problem arising under the old Act ~
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~
~

bee11 attempts to d1sguise penalties
labeJjng them as interest.

011

tax payments by

If the payments were

"interest" instead of "penalties," they would be allowable
under section 57j.
1157.22[2.1]

See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy

(14th ed. 1979).

The new Code codified a

benefit previously found only in
of this

Congress wanted to
provision

the formal label "penalty" to
ich, in the case of taxes, involve basically
tax under the label of a 'penalty.'"l5

B.

l5The Code's prov1s1ons establishing priority of payment
for tax penalties mirror this treatment.
In §507, that
ranks
various
claims
rece1v1ng
priority
in
the
distribution of assets, Congress granted a priority to
certain tax penalties, §507 (a) (6) (G).
In defining the
preferred penalties, Congress used exactly the language-(Footnote continued)
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considers the penal and rehabilitative interests of the
state.l6

Those interests are sufficient to place

restitution orders within the meaning of §523 (a) (7).
In light of the strong interests of the States,
~\)CA\+-~J
the uniform construction of the old Act over three- foyrtfl s

of a century, and the absence of any significant evidence
that Congress intended to change the law in this area, we
believe this result best effectuates the will of Congress.

l6This is not the only context in which courts have been
forced to evaluate the treatment of restitution orders by
determining whether they were "compensatory" or "penal."
Several lower courts have addressed the constitutionality
of the federal Victim Witness Protection Act, 18 u.s.c.
§3579.
Under that Act, defendants have no right to jury
trial as to the amount of restitution, even though the
Seventh Amendment would require such a trial if the issue
were decided in a civil case.
See Note, The Right to a
Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982, 63 Texas L. Rev. 671
(1984).
Every federal circuit court that has considered
the question has concluded that criminal defendants
contesting the assessment of restitution orders are not
entitled to the protections of the Seventh Amendment. See
id., at 672 n.l8 (citing cases).

47.

Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit is
REVERSED.

42.

A broader examination of the Code's treatment of
debts owed to governments demonstrates the logic of this
interpretation.

As we have explained above,

debts ~ r :} generally \ allowable under the Code.
government's interest

is ~

~~, c-vv

When the

that of a creditor, the Code

gives the government a first priority of payment, see
§726(a} (1}, but does not protect the debt from discharge.
When the government's interest is penal, its main interest
is not in receiving compensation, but in punishing or
rehabilitating the debtor.

Thus, the Code subordinates

payment of these debts in §726(a} (4}, but exempts them
from discharge under §523 (a} (7}.

Nothing in this

(Footnote 15 continued from previous page}
"compensation for actual pecuniary loss"--§ 523 (a} (7}
to limit dischargeability.
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framework mandates, or even counsels, an exception that
would treat restitution imposed as a condition of
probation any differently from other types of criminal
sentences.

-

Finally~ nside-.rat.ion
c.:.

~

of- the natrrre-ur-the.se

restitution
orders shows t-hat-the
-·1
.....
.
---a.D9 u.-ag..e.-.ciL ilifi~)C'N
·- ·...-~ ~-

-~--

can be understood to preven-t discharge.

The criminal

justice system is not operated primarily for the benefit
of victims, but for the benefit of society as a whole.
Thus, it is concerned not only with punishing the
offender, but also with rehabilitating him.

Although

restitution does resemble a judgment "for the benefit of"

44.

the victim, the context in which it is imposed undermines
that conclusion.

The victim has no control over the

amount of restitution awarded or over the decision to
award restitution.

Moreover, the decision to impose
-tll'i"V"

,......

restitution generally does not Feek on the victim's ~
5~h o--l-! 0>""'
-for compensa t ioa , but on the penal goals of the State and

the situation of the defendant.
This point is well illustrated by the Connecticut
statute under which the restitution obligation was
A

imposed.
)...

L

•

r::f-o

Sw.rc,v. (.. I "J
.e I
The statute authorizes a Ljudge ~ mpos~ a

sen tence of proba t 1on to i mpose any of eight specified
of ~)o'oo-.Y:o-

condition { , as well as "any other conditions reasonably
Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a-

related to

)
Clause (4) of that section authorizes a judge
to require that the defendant
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make restitution of the fruits of his offense or
make restitution, in an amount he can afford to
pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the
loss or damage caused thereby and the court may
fix the amount thereof and the manner of
performance.

This clause does not require imposition of restitution in
the amount of the harm caused.

Instead, it provides for a
~

~Pe;uct-CN' CK!#V\~)

flexible remedy tailored to the cp nd it ion& speei-f i:J;Ied t n
c) ~k~ J c:,vJ+' ~
s ~ 1--v "'4--! o \f'\. statute ,. i-ncl uding -r-ehabilit;.a..t=-i-orr.-v--

~

Because criminal proceedings focus on the State's
interests in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than
the victim's desire for compensation, we conclude that
restitution orders imposed in such proceedings operate
"for the benefit of" the State.

Similarly, they are not

assessed "for ..• compensation" of the victim.

The

sentence following a criminal conviction necessarily
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523(a) (7) automatically exempts from discharge any
provision of a state criminal sentence.
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit is

REVERSED.

lfp/ss 10/18/86

KELLYR SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Ronald

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Oct. 18, 1986

85-1033 Kelly v. Robinson
On

the

basis of

a

first

reading,

draft of October 17 is quite good.
by the 47 pages,

I

think

your

Although I was shocked

in view of your margins -

that I like -

even its present length may be less than 20 printed pages.
I therefore have not attempted to identify possible major
omissions
done
this

a

or

to

reframe much of your

considerable

memorandum

amount

is

to

of

language.

editing.

make

The

additional

I

have

purpose of

comments

and

suggestions.
1. Your Part I
2.

(p. 1-14) looks fine.

Part II (p. 14-31, divided into subparts A, B

and C).
Subpart IIA (p. 14-21) also looks fine.
Subpart I IB
present

form.

significance.
arguments,

{p.

22-26)

Possibly
In

light

I

is not persuasive in its
do

of

not

the

appreciate

strength

of

its
other

could not the main thought of this subpart be

substantially

reduced?

Indeeed,

is

the

subject of

this

2.

subpart necessary?

Possibly we could wait to see what JPS

says.
Subpart
margin,

IIC

(p.

27-31),

except as noted

in the

I have suggested some omissions and

seems fine.

revisions.
3.

Part III

(p.

31-42)

with three parts.

The

preliminary discussion (p. 31-35) is excellent.
Subpart
difficult

IliA

discussion

(p.

32-42).

that

is

not

This

is

a

long

and

easy

to

follow.

Of

course, I am not as familiar with the statutes as you are.
This will be true, however, of other Justices and the bar.
Take

a

second

close

look

with

elimination S and

clarification.

necessary

ultimate

to our

the
If

view
this

to

possible

discussion

interpretation of

is

§523 (a) (7),

can it be shortened somewhat?
Subpart IIIB (p. 41-43) is fine.
Subpart IIIC (p. 43-46) is excellent.
4.

Part IV

(p.

47-48)

probably is unnecessary.

The final paragraph of Part III (p. 46)

is excellent.

may be helpful to add a summary sentence that refers,
addition

to

the

construction for

state

interests,

to

the

It
in

uniform

three fourths of a century of the 1898

3.

Act,

and the absence of any evidence

in the legislative

history to an intention to change this settled law.

* * *
I
(p.

add these

22-26)

necessary,

that

further

gives

thoughts

me

as you think,

some

about Subpart
It

trouble.

may

IIB
be

to address the view of CA2 that

Connecticut is not unduly burdened by its decision because
state officials

simply could

under §523 (c).

Is it clear that this would be true?

identify

"several

persuasive.

have objected

problems",

none

of

which

point,

is

You

entirely

I do not think a state prosecutor would have

to prove the elements of the crime (p. 23).
good

to discharge

in

light

of

counsel's

You do have a

concession,

paragraph that beings at the bottom of p.

23.

in

the

Also the

paragraph at the bottom of p. 24 - on my second reading
may

be

pertinent.

I

hope,

however,

we

do

not

have

to

concede that CA2 was right in saying that all Connecticut
had

to

do

was

to

write

a

letter

or

appear

bankruptcy court and object to discharge.
how burdensome this would be.
whether

state

bankruptcy

authorities

petitions.

I

even

Presumably

in

the

I do not know

suppose we do not know
follow

the

the

debtor

filing
as

of
I

believe happened in this case - would list the restitution

4.

order as a debt and ask that it be discharged.

Would not

this require notification of the proper state authority in

this

case

the probation office?

In

sum,

these five

pages seem to be the least persuasive.

* * *
In

general,

commendable.
less

than

I
a

I

think

your

draft

is

quite

do not see how you accomplished this in
week,

as

the

draft

reflects

a

wide

understanding of both the old and new acts as well as of
the relevant court decisions.

Also, I think your style of

writing conforms fairly closely to mine.
If
Otherwise,

you

have

specific

questions

we

can

talk.

I suggest that you do a second draft, and then

submit it to your "editor" - your co-clerk who will review
the draft
article

or

just as an officer of a law review reviews an
a

note

submitted

for

publication.

includes substantive review as well as cite checking.

( ~1:(/

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

1v

This

Tb:
From:
Re:

Justice Powell
Ronald
No. 85-1033, Kelly v. Robinson

1. I have spoken with Justice Blackmun's clerk. BeJustice Blackmun prepared this case himself, his clerk
has not spoken with him about it and has no view as to Justice Blackmun's current thoughts.
~use

2. Further thought has led me to recommend a slight
change in the opinion. I think this change may alleviate
Justice O'Connor's concerns. As presently drafted, footnote
12, on pa~e 13, reserves the question of whether a fine 1s a
de~
In its present form, it is rather encouraging to the
"nondebt" view. Perhaps she would be satisfied if we made
~e footnote more encouraging to the debt view.
This could
be done by two changes:
(a} after the words "legislative
history" in the second line of the note, insert the clause
[, as well as the Code's various priority and
dischargeability provisions,]; (b) change the word "suggests" in the 4th line of the note to "compels the conclusion." I think a more even-handed treatment improves the
opinion in three ways. First, reference to the other sections of the Code may remind lower courts of the difficulties of holding that a "fine" is not a "debt." Second, it
will defuse commentators who are certain to say that we were
not aware of these provisions. Third, it is a more accurate
statement of the considerations before us.
My conversations with Justice O'Connor's clerk indi~te that she may not be satisfied by anything less than a
firm holding that these are debts. As you know, I do not
believe there is any significant practical effect. It may
be helpful to explain the basis for this conclusion in some
detail:
Chapter 7: If a fine is a debt under Chapter 7, payment is subordinated under §726 (a} (4). Thus, the fine would
receive nothing until all secured and unsecured creditors
had been paid. It would then receive the balance of funds
in the estate. If it were not a debt, these funds would be
returned to the debtor under §726(a) (6), after deductions
for postpetition interest under §726 (a) (5) (in consumer
bankruptcies, which go quite swiftly, postpetition interest
is usually minimal). Because the Court holds here that all
criminal penalties are nondischargeable, the State could sue
the debtor immediately, perhaps even before the Bankruptcy

2.
Court disburses the funds. Thus, there would be little
practical difference.
Chapter 11: Under §114l(d) (2), the dischargeability
provisions of §523 are incorporated in Chapter 11. Thus,
criminal fines would not be discharged in Chapter 11. It is
difficult to evaluate the bargaining power States would have
in Chapter 11, which has no firm priority provisions. Although I do not have the Code sections in mind, their bargaining power should resemble their (low) priority status
under Chapter 7. Thus, for the reasons articulated above,
there is not likely to be any practical difference.
Chapter 13: One of the biggest concerns of the
~erks about "debt" status has been a perception that Chapter 13 (wage-earner plan) discharges all debts except child
support payments. §1328(a) (2). This is not correct. Chap) ter 13 also preserves from discharge any debt "on which the
last payment is due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due." §1322Cb) (5) (preserved from
discharge by §1328(a) (1). Chapter 13 plans usually last 3
years; most criminal restitution orders last longer than
~ree years, and thus would be preserved from discharge.
In
fact, a plan under Chapter 13 must provide for full payment
on such a debt for the duration of the plan. §1322(b) (5).
There are further complexities in this area, but this is the
general framework.

tion payments was a debt within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code.

B. The Dischargeability of the Restitution Debt
The final question is whether Robinson's restitution
debt to COAP was dischargeable. Section 523 of the
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523, excludes from discharge several
categories of debts that would otherwise be discharged
under § 727(b), and three of these categories have arguable relevance to the present case. Section 523(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt(2) for obtaining money, property, services, or
an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit, by(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or

actual fraud, other than a statement respecting
the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
or
(B) use of a statement in writing-

·.

(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's
financial condition;

(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor
is liable for obtaining such money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied;
and

6564
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at least 1
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though J
to which
result of
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does no·
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sect
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§ 523.

While at first glance all three subsections seem to have
at least potential applicability to Robinson's debt, only
subsection (a)(7) need concern us on this appeal. A) hough Robinson's obtaining Public Assistance benefits
to which she was not entitled may well have occurred as a
esult of false representations within the meaning of
ubsection (a)(2), and although she was convicted of
arceny, which is covered by subsection (a)(4), the Code
oes not exclude debts within these subsections from
discharge if the creditor does not object to discharge.
hus, § 523(c) of the Code provides that
the debtor shall be discharged from a debt specified
in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of subsection (a) of this
section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom
such debt is owned [sic], and after notice and a
hearing, the court determines such debt to be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), or
(6), as the case may be, of subsection (a) of this
section.
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11 U.S.C. § 523(c). See Bankruptcy Rule 409(a) (reprinted in 11 U .S.C. app. 217 (1982)); Senate Report at
80, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787,
5865-66; House Report at 365, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News, 5963, 6321; 3 Collier on
Bankruptcy, 523.21 (L. King 15th ed. 1983).
In the present case, the bankruptcy court gave COAP
and CDIM notice in February 1981 that their claims were
listed in Robinson's petition; that April 27, 1981, was the
last day for filing objections to discharge or complaints to
determine dischargeability under § 523(c); and that the
failure by that date to file a complaint as to the dischargeability of a debt under §§ 523(a)(2) or (4) might result in
discharge of the debt. COAP and CDIM did not file such
objections or complaints. We suspect that had objection
been made on the ground that t e debt was or an
es~eny, the court wou~ excepted it f.rom
dischar~e, and the case would not be before us now.
COAP and CDIM waived their rights under subsections
(a)(2) and (a)(4), however, and we turn, therefore, to their
contention that the debt was nondischargeable under
subsection (a)(7).
Subsection (a)(7) makes a debt nondischargeable "to
the extent" that (1) it is for a "fine, penalty, or forfeiture," (2) it is "payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit," and (3) it is "not compensation for
actual pecuniary loss." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). There is no
question that Robinson's restitution debt is in a sense a
penalty for her crime. See, e.g., United States v. Brown,
744 F.2d at 909; United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d at
217-18; In re Vik, 45 B,R. at 67-68; In re Johnson, 32
B.R. at 616; In re Magnifico, 21 B.R. at 803; see also 18
U.S.C. § 3579(a)(l), which empowers a federal court

..
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sentencing a defendant for an offense under title 18 to
order the defendant to make restitution "in addition to or
in lieu of any other penalty" (emphasis added). Nor is
there any question that Robinson's debt is payable to and
for the benefit of a governmental unit. We do not believe
it can be said, however, that the debt is "not," "to [some]
extent," "compensation for actual pecuniary loss."
Under the Connecticut probation scheme, the state
court is given discretion to order an offender to "make
restitution of the fruits of his offense or make restitution,
in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a suitable
manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby". Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-30(a)(4) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). Thus, the amount of restitution to be
assessed against a defendant, though it may be adjusted
to account for his ability to pay, is measured by the fruits
of the debtor's offense or by the victim's resulting loss or
damage. These criminal restitution payments, though
initially paid to COAP, are ultimately remitted to the
victim of the defendant's crime. See In re Mead, 41 B.R.
at 840; In re Pellegrino, 42 B.R. at 132. In the present
case, the amount of money wrongfully received by Robinson from CDIM was $9,932.95. The amount of restitution that Robinson was ordered to pay was precisely
$9,932.95. Thus, defendants admit on this appeal, as they
must, that "the restitution [to be paid by Robinson] also
had compensatory consequences . . .. " The conclusion
is inescapable that Robinson's obligation to make restitution payments to COAP in the exact amount lost by
CDIM, which COAP would then remit to CDIM, was
designed to be, among other things, compensation for
CDIM's actual pecuniary loss.

·ers a federal court
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Rider A, p. 10 (Kelly)

KELLYA SALLY-POW
The Court of Appeals nevertheless found support for its
holding in the fact that Connecticut officials probably
could have ensured continued enforcement of their court's
criminal judgment against Robinson had they objected to
discharge under §523(c).

While this may be true in many

cases, it hardly justifies an interpretation of the 1978
Act that is contrary to the long prevailing view that
"fines and penalties are not affected by a discharge".
Collier on Bankruptcy, id.
Moreover, reliance on a right to appear and
object to discharge would create uncertainties and impose
undue burdens on state officials.

In some cases it would

2.

require state prosecutors to defend particular state
criminal judgments before the federal bankruptcy courts. 8

8.

In some cases principle of issue preclusion could

obviate the need for reexamination of factual questions,
or interpretations of state law, in the bankruptcy court.
Differences between the elements of crime and the
provisions of §523 could, however, hinder the application
of issue preclusion.

Moreover, apart from the burden on

state officials of following and participating in
bankruptcy proceedings, there is the unseemliness of
requiring state prosecutors to submit the judgments of
their criminal courts to federal bankruptcy judges."
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1033

JOHN J. KELLY, CONNECTICUT CHIEF STATE'S
ATTORNEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CAROLYN ROBINSON
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[October - , 1986]

JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted review in this case to decide whether restitution obligations, imposed as conditions of probation in state
criminal proceedings, are dischargeable in proceedings under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
I
In 1980, Carolyn Robinson pled guilty to larceny in the second degree. The charge was based on her wrongful receipt
of $9,932.95 in welfare benefits from the Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance. On November 14, 1980, the
Connecticut Superior Court sentenced Robinson to a prison
term of not less than one year nor more than three years.
The court suspended execution of the sentence and placed
Robinson on probation for five years. As a condition of probation, the judge ordered Robinson to make restitution 1 to
the State of Connecticut Office of Adult Probation (Probation
1
Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 53a-30 sets out the conditions a trial court
may impose on a sentence of probation. Clause 4 of that section authorizes
dition that the defendant
'' make restitution of the fruits o his offense or make restitution, in an
amount he can afford to pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or
damage caused thereby and the court may fix the amount thereof and the
manner of performance. "
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Office) at the rate of $100 per month, commencing January
16, 1981, and continuing until the end of her probation. 2
On February 5, 1981, Robinson filed a voluntary petition
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 701 et
seq., in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Connecticut. That petition listed the restitution obligation as a debt. On February 20, 1981, the Bankruptcy Court
notified bo the Connecticut agencies of Robinson's petition
and informeo them that April 27, 1981, was the deadline for
filing objections to discharge. The agencies did not file
proofs of claim or objections to discharge, apparently because
they took the position that the bankruptcy would not affect
the conditions of Robinson's probation. Thus, the agencies
did not participate in the distribution of Robinson's estate.
On May 14, 1981, the bankruptcy court granted Robinson a
discharge. See § 727.
At the time Robinson received her discharge in bankruptcy, she had paid $450 in restitution. On May 20, 1981,
her attorney wrote the Probation Office that he believed the
discharge had altered the conditions of Robinson's probation,
voiding the condition that she pay restitution. Robinson
made no further payments.
The Connecticut Probation Office did not respond to this
letter until February 1984, when it informed Robinson that it
considered the obligation to pay restitution nondischargeable. Robinson responded by filing an adversary proceeding
in the Bankruptcy Court, seeking a declaration that the restitution obligation had been discharged, as well as an injunction to prevent the State's officials from forcing Robinson to
pay.
After a trial, the Bankruptcy Court entered a Memorandum and Proposed Order, concluding that the 1981 discharge
2

There is some uncertainty about the total amount Robinson was ordered to pay. Although the judge imposed restitution in a total amount of
$9,932.95, five years of payments at one hundred dollars a month total only
$) 000.
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in bankruptcy had not altered the conditions of Robinson's
probation. The court adopted the analysis it had applied in a
similar case decided one month earlier, In re Pellegrino
(Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal Justice), 42 B. R. 129
(Bkrtcy. Ct. Conn. 1984). ~
.
<Tn Pellegrino, the court egan with the Bankruptcy Code's
definitional sections. First, § 101(11) defines a "debt" as a
"liability on a claim." In turn, § 101(4) defines a "claim" as a
"right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Finally, § 101(9) defines a "creditor"
as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at
the time of or before the order for relief concerning the
debtor."
The Bankruptcy Court then examined the statute under
which the Connecticut judge had sentenced the debtor to pay
restitution. Restitution appears as one of the conditions of
probation enumerated in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30. Under
that section, restitution payments are sent to the Probation
Office. The payments then are forwarded to the victim.
Although the Connecticut penal code does not provide for enforcement of the probation conditions by the victim, it does
authorize the trial court to issue a warrant for the arrest of a
criminal defendant who has violated a condition of probation.
§53a-32.
Because the Connecticut statute does not allow the victim
to enforce a right to receive payment, the court concluded
that neither )the victim nor the Probation Office had a "right
to payment~ and hence neither was owed a "debt" under the
Bankruptcy Code. It argued:

(

(Unlike an obligation which arises out of a contractual,
statutory or common law duty, here the obligation is
rooted in the traditional responsibility of a state to protect its citizens by enforcing its criminal statutes and to
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rehabilitate an offender b~ imposing a criminal sanction
intended for that purpose.> 42 B. R., at 133.
-::>
e cou acknowledged the tension e ;ween itSConclusion
and the Code's expansive definition of debt, but found an exception to the statutory definition in "the long-standing tradition of restraint by federal courts from interference with tradif
·
of state governments." I d., at 134.
The court concluded tha , even 1 e pro a 10n co
on
was a debt subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction, it was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7) of the Code. That subsection
provides that a discharge in bankruptcy does not affect any
debt that "is ·for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and
for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss."
- -.-ne co
that the purpose of the restitution
condition was "to promote the rehabilitation of the offender,
not to compensate the victim." 42 B. R., at 137. It specifically rejected the argument that the restitution must be
deemed compensatory because the amount precisely matched
the victim's loss. It noted that the state statute allows an
offender "to make restitution of the fruits of his offense or
make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused
thereby," Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4). In its view, the
Connecticut statute focuses "upon the offender and not on the
victim, and . . . restitution is part of the criminal penalty
rather than compensation for a victim's actual loss." 42
B. R., at 137. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court held that the
bankruptcy discharge had not affected the conditions of
Pellegrino's probation. The United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut adopted the Bankruptcy Court's
proposed dispositions of Pellegrino and this case without
alteration.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It
first examined the Code's definition of debt. Although it
recognized that most courts had reached the opposite conclu-
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sion, the court decided that a restitution obligation imposed
as a condition of probation is a debt. It relied on the legislative history of the Code that evinced Congress's intent to
broaden the definition of "debt" from the much narrower definition of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The court also noted
that anomalies might result from a conclusion that such an
obligation is not a debt. Most importantly, nondebt sta~t;..:u_s~-r
would deprive a state of the opportunity to participate in distribution of the bankrupt's estate.
Having concluded that restitution obligations are debts,
the court turned to the question of dischargeability. The
court stated that the appropriate Connecticut agency probably could have avoided discharge ofthe debt if it had objected
under §§ 523(a)(2) or 523(a)(4) of the Code. 3 As no objections to discharge were filed, the court concluded that the
State could rely only on § 523(a)(7), the subsection that provides for automatic nondischargeability for certain debts. 4
The court then looked to the text of the Connecticut statute
to determine whether Robinson's probation condition was
"compensation for actual pecuniary loss" within the meaning
of § 523(a)(7). But where the Bankruptcy Court had consid3
Section 523(a)(2)(A) protects from discharge debts "for obtaining
money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit,
by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud ." Section
523(a)(4) protects from discharge debts "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." Under § 523(c),
debts that are protected from discharge only by § 523(a)(2) or § 523(a)(4)
are discharged unless the creditor files an objection to discharge during the
bankruptcy proceedings. Because Robinson was convicted of larceny, one
of the debts listed in§ 523(a)(4), it is quite likely that the Bankruptcy Court
would have found the debt nondischargeable under that subsection.
' The requirement that creditors object to discharge is limited on its
face to paragraphs (2), (4), and (6) of§ 523(a). Because paragraph 7 is not
listed there, debts described in that paragraph are automatically nondischargeable, under the general rule prescribed in the opening clause of
§ 523(a) (providing that a "discharge under section 727 . .. of this title does
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt" listed in the paragpQf!At
that follow).

~

~_;.:::::.--

y
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ered the entire state probation system, the Court of Appeals
focused only on the language that allows a restitution order
to be assessed "for the loss or damage caused [by the crime],"
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4). The court thought this language compelled the conclusion that the probation condition
was "compensation for actual pecuniary loss." It held,
therefore, that this particular condition of Robinson's probation was not protected from discharge by § 523(a)(7). Accordingly, it reversed the District Court.
We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari.
We have jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of
Appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1). We reverse.
II
The Court of Appeals' decision focused primarily on the
language of §§ 101 and 523 of the Code. Of course, the
"starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring). But the text is only the starting point. As JUSTICE
O'CONNOR explained last Term, "'"In expounding a statute,
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to
its object and policy.""' Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. - - , - - (1986) (quoting Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 350 U. S. 270, 285
(1956) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdorl, 8 How.
113, 122 (184 ))).. In this case, we must consider the language of§§ 10 and 523 in light of the history of bankruptcy
court deference to criminal judgments and in light of the interests of the States in unfettered administration of their
criminal justice systems.
A
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to interpret federal bankruptcy statutes to remit state criminal judgments.
The present text of Title llTommonly referred to as the

~
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Bankruptcy Code, was enacted in 1978 to replace the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. 5 The treatment of
criminal judgments under the Act of 1898 informs our understanding of the language of the Code.
First, § 57 of the Act established the category of "allowable" debts. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ~57 (14th ed. 1977).
Only if a debt was allowable could the creditor receive a share
of the bankrupt's assets. See § 65a. For this case, it is important to note that § 57j excluded from the class of allowable
debts penalties owed to government entities. That section
provided:
Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a
district, or a municipality as a penalty or forfeiture shall
not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary
loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out
of which the penalty or forfeiture arose. 30 Stat., at
561.
Second, § 63 established the separate category of "provable" debts. See 3A Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 63 (14th ed.
1975). Section 17 provided that a discharge in bankruptcy
"release[d] a bankrupt from all of his provable debts," subject
to several exceptions listed in later portions of § 17. Although § 17 specifically excepted four types of debts from discharge, it did not mention criminal penalties of any kind.
The most natural construction of the Act; therefore would
have allowed criminal penalties to be discharged itl> bankruptcy, even though the government was not entitled to a
share of the bankrupt's estate. Congress had considered
criminal penalties when it passed the Act; it clearly made
them nonallowable. The failure expressly to make them
5
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act several times between 1898
and 1978. Congress also made numerous technical changes to the Code in
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 380. None of those changes is relevant to this
decision.
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nondischargeable at the same time offered substantial support for the view that the Act discharged those penalties.
But the courts did not interpret the Act in this way. Despite the clear statutory language, most courts refused to
allow a discharge in bankruptcy to affect the judgment of a
state criminal court.
In the leading case, the court
reasoned:
It might be admitted that sections 63 and 17 of the bankrupt act, if only the letter of those provisions be looked
to, would embrace [criminal penalties]; but it is well settled that there may be cases in which such literal construction is not admissible .... It may suffice to say that
nothing but a ruling from a higher court would convince
me that congress, by any provision of the bankrupt act,
intended to permit the discharge, under its operations,
of any judgment entered by a state or federal court imposing a fine in the enforcement of criminal laws. . . .
The provisions of the bankrupt act have reference alone
to civil liabilities, as demands between debtor and creditors, as such, and not to punishment inflicted pro bono
publico for crimes committed." In re Moore, 111 F. 145,
148-149 (WD Ky. 1901). 6
This reasoning was ·
accepted by the time Congress enacted the new Code that a leading commentator
could state flatly that "fines and penalties are not affected by
6
Although courts differed as to the boundaries of the exception, particularly in cases involving nonmonetary sanctions, or sanctions imposed in
civil proceedings, the reasoning of Moqre was widely accepted. See, e. g.,
Parker v. United States, 153 F. 2d 66, 71 (CAl 1946) (citing Moore and
noting that "[i]t was not in the contemplation of Congress that the federal
bankruptcy power should be employed to pardon a bankrupt from the consequences of a criminal offense"); Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F. 2d 110, 116
(CA2 1967) (citing Moore and stating that "governmental sanctions are not
regarded as debts even when they require monetary payments"). We Q__
have found only one federal court decision allowing a discharge ~~
___.-!~~to affect a sentence imposed by a criminal court. In re Alderson,
98 F. 588 (W. Va. 1899).
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a discharge." See lA Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 17 .13, at
1609-1610, and n. 10 (14th ed. 1979).
Moreover, those few courts faced with restitution obligations imposed as part of criminal sentences applied the same
reasoning to prevent a discharge in bankruptcy from affecting such a condition of a criminal sentence. For instance,
four years before Congress enacted the Code, the New York
Supreme Court stated:
A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect whatsoever
upon a condition of restitution of a criminal sentence. A
bankruptcy proceeding is civil in nature and is intended
to relieve an honest and unfortunate debtor of his debts
and to permit him to begin his financial life anew. A
condition of restitution in a sentence of probation is· a
part of the judgment of conviction. It does not create a
debt nor a debtor/creditor relationship between the persons making and receiving restitution. As with any
other condition of a probationary sentence it is intended
as a means to insure the defendant will lead a law-abiding life thereafter. State v. Mosesson, 78 Misc. 2d 217,
218, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 483, 484 (1974) (citations omitted). 7
k-Thus, Congress enacted the Code in 1978 against the back\round of an established judicial exception to discharge for
criminal sentences, including restitution orders, an exception
created in the face of a statute drafted with considerable care
and specificity.
Just last Term we declined to hold that the new Bankruptcy Code silently abrogated exceptiOn crea e b cou s
construing the old Act. In Midlaritic Nationa ank v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U. S.
- - (1986), a trustee in bankruptcy asked us to hold that the
1978 Code had implicitly repealed an exception to the trust7

For other decisions adopting this reasoning, see State ex rel. Auerbach
v. Topping Bros., 79 Misc. 2d 260, 359 N. Y. S. 2d 985, 987-988 (Crim. Ct.
1974); State v. Washburn, 97 Cal. App. 3d 621, 625-626, 158 Cal. Rptr.
822, 825 (1979).
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ee's abandonment power. Courts had created that exception
out of deference to state health and safety regulations, a consideration comparable to the States' interests implicated by
this case. We stated:
The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation
of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. The Court has followed this rule with particular
care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications.
If Congress wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary
exemption from non-bankruptcy law, "the intention
would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or
inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in
administering the estate of the bankrupt." 474 U. S. , at
- - (quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904)) (citations omitted).
B
Our interpretation of the Code also must reflect the basis
for this judicial exception, a deep conviction that federal
bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state
criminal proceedings. The right to formulate and enforce
penal sanctions is an important aspect of the sovereignty retained by the States. This Court has emphasized repeatedly
"the fundamental policy against federal interference with
state criminal prosecutions." Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S.
37, 46 (1971). ~re-€fottr:&-ef.~~~aclllds4-tflat-elmffi!ct--1

:r=~
A)~
S \\ tD~ ~ (;,P\

binson argues that the burden on the state often would be slight.
any cases, principles of issue preclusion might obviate the need for
ences beitigation of factUal questions in the bankrUptcy comt. -Ir

(.v/~o~kg)
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As JUSTICE BRENNAN has noted, federal adjudication of matters already at issue in state criminal proceedings can be "an
unwarranted and unseemly duplication of the State's own adjudicative process." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 121
(1971) (opinion of BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 9
t:ieeeflttt, as Robinson's attorney conceded at oral argument,
some restitution orders would not be protected from discharge even if the state did appear and enter an objection to
discharge. For example, a ePimiHal .fudge m a neghgent
homicide case might sentence the defendant to probation,
conditioned on the defendant's paying the victim's husband
compensation for the loss the husband sustained when the
defendant killed his wife. It ·is not clear that such a restitution order would fit the terms of any of the exceptions to
discharge listed in § 523 other than § 523(a)(7). Thus, this interpretation of the Code would do more than force state prosecutors to defend state criminal judgments in federal bankru c court.
·
·
lead to federal remission
of judgments imposed by state criminal judges.
This prospect, in turn, would hamper the flexibility of state
criminal judges in choosing the combination of imprisonment,
fines, and restitution most likely to further
·
he defendant. Restitution is a articul
....__...~~hahi.li.tation-because-i forces-the-defendant to confront,
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concrete terms, he har-m-his-actio
1
prefer such an order to a fine, paid to the Sta e
as an aost~nd impersonal entity, and often calculate
without regard toth arm the defendant has caused. Th
direct relation between t
m and the punishment rna
make restitution a valuable deterr
as well. 10
Robinson attempts to minimize this iff4!ulty by arguin
that state prosecutors and criminal judges n~ only consult
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code before se e ing the
appropriate sentence. This contention misses the pomt en- - tirely. We are not troubled by requirements\that state of: ·
c:iais uade~tand and apply federal-law. Bu't Yfe will not
lightly limit the rehabilitative and deterrent optiolis available
·
to state criminal judges.
1

·~often

I~~

~"'""' 6\\0"33 GJ\.

I
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This reflection of our federalism also must influence
our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in this case. 11

III
~

\.)

In light of the ~pr.e..COOe-traditwn
ltrding-b:m
xuptcy-.courts..frn-altering-criminal judgments we have serious doubts whether Congress intended to make crimma
penalties "debts" within the meaning of § 101(4). 12 But we
need not address that question in this case, because we hold
that § 523(a)(7) preserves from discharge any condition a
state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal sentence.
The relevant portion of § 523(a)(7) protects from discharge
any debt
to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit,
and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.
This language is subject to interpretation. On its face,
§ 523(a)(7) certainly does not compel the conclusion reached
"Justice Frankfurter advocated a similar approach to the interpretation
of regulatory statutes that infringe upon important state interests:
The task is one of accommodation as between assertions of new federal authority and historic functions of the individual states. Federal legislation
of this character cannot therefore be construed without regard to the implications of our dual system of government.... The underlying assumptions
of our dual form of government, and the consequent presuppositions of legislative draftsmanship which are expressive of our history and habits, cut
across what might otherwise be the implied range of legislation. The history of congressional legislation .. . justif[ies] the generalization that,
when the Federal Government takes over such local radiations in the vast
network of our national economic enterprise and thereby radically readjusts the balance of state and national authority, those charged with the
duty of legislating are reasonably explicit. Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 539-540 (1947).
12
We re<;ognize, as the Court of Appeals emphasized, that the Code's
definition of "debt" is broadly drafted, and that the legislative history supports a broad reading of the definition. But nothing in the legislative history of these sections suggests that Congress intended to change the state
of the law with respect to criminal judgments.
"'
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by the Court of Appeals, that a discharge in bankruptcy voids
restitution orders imposed as conditions of probation by state
courts. Now here in the House and Senate Reports~
any indication that this language should be read so int:fu- 0
sively. 13 If Congress had intended, by § 523(a)(7) or by any
other provision, to discharge state criminal sentences, "we
can be certain that there would have been hearings, testimony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so
inimical to purposes previously deemed important, and so
likely to arouse public outrage," Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 209 (1978) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
Our reading of § 523(a)(7) differs from that of the Second
Circuit. On its face, it creates a broad exception for all penal
sanctions, whether they be denominated fines, penalties, or
forfeitures. Congress included two qualifying phrases; the
~--~-'...;;F....;o:i';r..;,;,the
3

section-by-section analysis in the le 'slative re orts see H
.,
(1977); S. Rep. No. 989,~
ep. No. 595,
.,
79 (1978). For explanations of the section by con:tmentators, see 3 Collier on Bankruptcy H23.17 (15th ed. 1986); 1 Norton
Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 27.37 (1981). In fact, both of these commentators expressly state that the language
ot have the intrusive
effect sought by Robinson. See Collier,~ 523.17, at 523-123 n. 4; Norton,
§ 27.37, at 55 n. 2.
It seems likely that the limitation of § 523(a)(7) to fines assessed "for the
benefit of a federal, state, or local government" was intended to prevent
at subsection to wholly private penalties such as punitive
a lication
damages. See House oc. o. 37, pt. 2,
116 141
(1973). As for the reference to 'compensation for actual pecuniary loss,"
the Senate Report indicates that the main purpose of this language was to
prevent § 523(a)(7) from being applied to tax penalties. S. Rep. No. 89,
.'
79 (1978).
We acknowledge that a few
comments in the hearings and the
Bankruptcy Laws Commission Report may suggest that the language
bears the interpretation adopted by the Second Circuit. But none of those
· statements was made by a member of Congress, nor were they included in
the official Senate and House reports. We decline to accord any significance to these statements. See McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283
U. S. 488, 493-494 (1931); 2A N. Singer, Sut~erland on Statutory Construction § 48.10, at 319, and n. 11 (rev. 4th ed. 1984).
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fines must be both "to and for the benefit of a governmental
unit," and "not compensation for pecuniary loss." Section
523(a)(7) protects traditional criminal fines; it codifies the judicially created exception to discharge for fines. We must
decide whether the result is altered by the two major differences between restitution and a traditional fine. Unlike traditional fines, restitution is forwarded to the victim, and may
be calculated by reference to the amount of harm the offender
has caused.
In our view, neither of the qualifying clauses of§ 523(a)(7)
allows the discharge of a criminal judgment that takes the
form of restitution. The criminal justice system is not operated primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of
society as a whole. Thus, it is concerned not only with punishing the offender, but also with rehabilitating him. Although restitution does resemble a judgment "for the benefit
of" the victim, the context in which it is imposed undermines
that conclusion. The victim has no control over the amount
of restitution awarded or over the decision to award restitution. Moreover, the decision to impose restitution generally
does not turn on the victim's injury, but on the penal goals of
the State and the situation of the defendant.
---~his point is well illustrated by the Connecticut statute
under w 1c
restitution obligation was imposed. The
statute authorizes a judge to impose any of eight specified
conditions of probation, as well as "any other conditions
reasonably related to his rehabilitation." Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 53a-30(a)(9). Clause (4) of that section authorizes a judge
to require that the defendant
make restitution of the fruits of his offense or make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a
suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby
and the court may fix the amount thereof and the manner of performance.
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This clause does not require imposition of restitution in th
amount of the harm caused. Instead, it provides for a fl.exi-'----~--"<;:--
ble remedy tailored to the defendant's situation.
Because criminal proceedings focus on the State's interests
in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim's desire for compensation, we conclude that restitution orders imposed in such proceedings operate "for the benefit of" the
State. Similarly, they are not assessed "for ... compensation" of the victim. The sentence following a criminal conviction necessarily considers the penal and rehabilitative interests of the state. 14 Those interests are sufficient to place
restitution orders within the meaning of § 523(a)(7).
In light of the strong interests of the States, the uniform
construction of the old Act over three-quarters of a century,
and the absence of any significant evidence that Congress intended to change the law in this area, we believe this result
best effectuates the will of Congress. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is

Reversed.

Q)

This is not the only context in which courts have been forced to evaluate the treatment of restitution orders by determining whether they~
"compensatory" or "penal." Several lower courts have addressed the constitutionality of the federal Victim Witness Protection Act, 18 U. S. C.
§ 3579. Under that Act, defendants have no right to jury trial as to the
amount of restitution, even though the Seventh Amendment would require
such a trial if the issue were decided in a civil case. See Note, The Right
to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982, 63 Texas L. Rev. 671 (1984). Every federal circuit
court that has considered the question has concluded that criminal defendants contesting the assessment of restitution orders are not entitled to
the protections of the Seventh Amendment. See id., at 672 n. 18 (citing
14

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
Justice Scalia

10/22

From:

Justice Powell

Circulated:

OCT 2 2 '1986.

Recirculated: _ _ __ _ _ __ _

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1033

JOHN J. KELLY, CONNECTICUT CHIEF STATE'S
ATTORNEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CAROLYN ROBINSON
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[October-, 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted review in this case to decide whether restitution obligations, imposed as conditions of probation in state
criminal proceedings, are dischargeable in proceedings under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
I

In 1980, Carolyn Robinson pled guilty to larceny in the second degree. The charge was based on her wrongful receipt
. of $9,932.95 in welfare benefits from the Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance. On November 14, 1980, the
Connecticut Superior Court sentenced Robinson to a prison
term of not less than one year nor more than three years.
The court suspended execution of the sentence and placed
Robinson on probation for five years. As a condition of probation, the judge ordered Robinson to make restitution 1 to
the State of Connecticut Office of Adult Probation (Probation
' Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 53a-30 sets out the conditions a trial court
may impose on a sentence of probation. Clause 4 of that section authorizes
a condition that the defendant "make restitution of the fruits of his offense
or make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby and the court may fix
the amount thereof and the manner of performance."
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Office) at the rate of $100 per month, commencing January
16, 1981, and continuing until the end of her probation. 2
On February 5, 1981, Robinson filed a voluntary petition
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 701 et
seq., in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Connecticut. That petition listed the restitution obligation as a debt. On February 20, 1981, the Bankruptcy Court
notified both of the Connecticut agencies of Robinson's petition and informed them that April27, 1981, was the deadline
for filing objections to discharge. The agencies did not file
proofs of claim or objections to discharge, apparently because
they took the position that the bankruptcy would not affect
the conditions of Robinson's probation. Thus, the agencies
did not participate in the distribution of Robinson's estate.
On May 14, 1981, the bankruptcy court granted Robinson a
discharge. See § 727.
At the time Robinson received her discharge in bankruptcy, she had paid $450 in restitution. On May 20, 1981,
her attorney wrote the Probation Office that he believed the
discharge had altered the conditions of Robinson's probation,
voiding the condition that she pay restitution. Robinson
made no further payments.
The Connecticut Probation Office did not respond to this
letter until February 1984, when it informed Robinson that it
considered the obligation to pay restitution nondischargeable. Robinson responded by filing an adversary proceeding
in the Bankruptcy Court, seeking a declaration that the restitution obligation had been discharged, as well as an injunction to prevent the State's officials from forcing Robinson to
pay.
After a trial, the Bankruptcy Court entered a Memorandum and Proposed Order, concluding that the 1981 discharge
2
There is some uncertainty about the total amount Robinson was
ordered to pay. Although the judge imposed restitution in a total amount
of $9,932.95, five years of payments at one hundred dollars a month total
only $6,000.
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in bankruptcy had not altered the conditions of Robinson's
probation. The court adopted the analysis it had applied in a
similar case decided one month earlier, In re Pellegrino
(Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal Justice), 42 B. R. 129
(Bkrtcy. Ct. Conn. 1984). In Pellegrino, the court began
with the Bankruptcy Code's definitional sections. First,
§ 101(11) defines a "debt" as a "liability on a claim." In turn,
§ 101(4) defines a "claim" as a "right to payment, whether or
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Finally,
§ 101(9) defines a "creditor" as an "entity that has a claim
against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the
order for relief concerning the debtor."
The Bankruptcy Court then examined the statute under
which the Connecticut judge had sentenced the debtor to pay
restitution. Restitution appears as one of the conditions of
probation enumerated in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30. Under
that section, restitution payments are sent to the Probation
Office. The payments then are forwarded to the victim.
Although the Connecticut penal code does not provide for enforcement of the probation conditions by the victim, it does
authorize the trial court to issue a warrant for the arrest of a
criminal defendant who has violated a condition of probation.
§53a-32.
Because the Connecticut statute does not allow the victim
to enforce a right to receive payment, the court concluded
that neither the victim nor the Probation Office had a "right
to payment," and hence neither was owed a "debt" under the
Bankruptcy Code. It argued: "Unlike an obligation which
arises out of a contractual, statutory or common law duty,
here the obligation is rooted in the traditional responsibility
of a state to protect its citizens by enforcing its criminal statutes and to rehabilitate an offender by imposing a criminal
sanction intended for that purpose." 42 B. R., at 133. The
court acknowledged the tension between its conclusion and
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the Code's expansive definition of debt, but found an exception to the statutory definition in "the long-standing tradition
of restraint by federal courts from interference with traditional functions of state governments." I d., at 134. The
court concluded that, even if the probation condition was a
debt subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction, it was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7) of the Code. That subsection provides
that a discharge in bankruptcy does not affect any debt that
"is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the
benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for
actual pecuniary loss."
The court also concluded that the purpose of the restitution
condition was "to promote the rehabilitation of the offender,
not to compensate the victim." 42 B. R., at 137. It specifically rejected the argument that the restitution must be
deemed compensatory because the amount precisely matched
the victim's loss. It noted that the state statute allows an
offender "to make restitution of the· fruits of his offense or
make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused
thereby," Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4). In its view, the
Connecticut statute focuses "upon the offender and not on the
victim, and . . . restitution is part of the criminal penalty
rather than compensation for a victim's actual loss." 42
B. R., at 137. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court held that the
bankruptcy discharge had not affected the conditions of
Pellegrino's probation. The United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut adopted the Bankruptcy Court's
proposed dispositions of Pellegrino and" this case without
alteration.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It
first examined the Code's definition of debt. Although it
recognized that most courts had reached the opposite conclusion, the court decided that a restitution obligation imposed
as a condition of probation is a debt. It relied on the legislative history of the Code that evinced Congress's intent to
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broaden the definition of "debt" from the much narrower definition of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The court also noted
that anomalies might result from a conclusion that such an
obligation is not a debt. Most importantly, nondebt status
would deprive a state of the opportunity to participate in the
distribution of the bankrupt's estate.
Having concluded that restitution obligations are debts,
the court turned to the question of dischargeability. The
court stated that the appropriate Connecticut agency probably could have avoided discharge of the debt if it had objected
under §§ 523(a)(2) or 523(a)(4) of the Code. 3 As no objections to discharge were filed, the court concluded that the
State could rely only on § 523(a)(7), the subsection that provides for automatic nondischargeability for certain debts. 4
The court then looked to the text of the Connecticut statute
to determine whether Robinson's probation condition was
"compensation for actual pecuniary loss" within the meaning
of § 523(a)(7). But where the Bankruptcy Court had considered the entire state probation system, the Court of Appeals
focused only on the language that allows a restitution order
to be assessed "for the loss or damage caused [by the crime],"
Section 523(a)(2)(A) protects from discharge debts "for obtaining
money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit,
by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." Section
523(a)(4) protects from discharge debts "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." Under § 523(c),
debts that are protected from discharge only by § 523(a)(2) or § 523(a)(4)
are discharged unless the creditor files an objection to discharge during the
bankruptcy proceedings. Because Robinson was convicted of larceny, one
of the debts listed in§ 523(a)(4), it is quite likely that the Bankruptcy Court
would have found the debt nondischargeable under that subsection.
4
The requirement that creditors object to discharge is limited on its
face to paragraphs (2), (4) , and (6) of§ 523(a). Because paragraph 7 is not
listed there, debts described in that paragraph are automatically nondischargeable, under the general rule prescribed in the opening clause of
§ 523(a) (providing that a "discharge under section 727 . .. of this title does
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt" listed in the paragraphs
that follow).
3
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Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4). The court thought this language compelled the conclusion that the probation condition
was "compensation for actual pecuniary loss." It held,
therefore, that this particular condition of Robinson's probation was not protected from discharge by § 523(a)(7). Accordingly, it reversed the District Court.
We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari.
We have jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of
Appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1). We reverse.
II

The Court of Appeals' decision focused primarily on the
language of §§ 101 and 523 of the Code. Of course, the
"starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring). But the text is only the starting point. As JUSTICE
O'CONNOR explained last Term, "'"In expounding a statute,
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to
its object and policy.""' Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. - - , - - (1986) (quoting Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 350 U. S. 270, 285
(1956) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How.
113, 122 (1849))). In this case, we must consider the language of§§ 101 and 523 in light of the history of bankruptcy
court deferenc~ to criminal judgments and in light of the interests of the States in unfettered administration of their
criminal justice systems.
A
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to interpret federal bankruptcy statutes to remit state criminal judgments.
The present text of Title 11, commonly referred to as the
Bankruptcy Code, was enacted in 1978 to replace the Bank-
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ruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. 5 The treatment of
criminal judgments under the Act of 1898 informs our understanding of the language of the Code.
First, § 57 of the Act established the category of "allowable" debts. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ~57 (14th ed. 1977).
Only if a debt was allowable could the creditor receive a share
of the bankrupt's assets. See § 65a. For this case, it is important to note that § 57j excluded from the class of allowable
debts penalties owed to government entities. That section
provided:
Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a
·district, or a municipality as a penalty or forfeiture shall
not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary
loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out
of which the penalty or forfeiture arose. 30 Stat.,
at 561.
Second, § 63 established the separate category of "provable" debts. See 3A Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 63 (14th ed.
1975). Section 17 provided that a discharge in bankruptcy
"release[d] a bankrupt from all of his provable debts," subject
to several exceptions listed in later portions of § 17. Although § 17 specifically excepted four types of debts from discharge, it did not mention criminal penalties of any kind.
The most natural construction of the Act, therefore, would
have allowed criminal penalties to be discharged in bankruptcy, even though the government was not entitled to a
share of the bankrupt's estate. Congress had considered
criminal penalties when it passed the Act; it clearly made
them nonallowable. The failure expressly to make them
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act several times between 1898
and 1978. Congress also made numerous technical changes to the Code in
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 380. None of those changes is relevant to this
decision.
5
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nondischargeable at the same time offered substantial support for the view that the Act discharged those penalties.
But the courts did not interpret the Act in this way. Despite the clear statutory language, most courts refused to
allow a discharge in bankruptcy to affect the judgment of a
state criminal court.
In the leading case, the court
reasoned:
It might be admitted that sections 63 and 17 of the bankrupt act, if only the letter of those provisions be looked
to, would embrace [criminal penalties]; but it is well settled that there may be cases in which such literal construction is not admissible. . . . It may suffice to say that
nothing but a ruling from a higher court would convince
me that congress, by any provision of the bankrupt act,
intended to permit the discharge, under its operations,
of any judgment entered by a state or federal court imposing a fine in the enforcement of criminal laws. . . .
The provisions of the bankrupt act have reference alone
to civil liabilities, as demands between debtor and creditors, as such, and not to punishment inflicted pro bono
publico for crimes committed." In re Moore, 111 F. 145,
148-149 (WD Ky. 1901). 6
This reasoning was so widely accepted by the time Congress
enacted the new Code that a leading commentator could state
flatly that "fines and penalties are not affected by a disAlthough courts differed as to the boundaries of the exception, particularly in cases involving nonmonetary sanctions, or sanctions imposed in
civil proceedings, the reasoning of Moore was widely accepted. See, e. g. ,
Parker v. United States , 153 F . 2d 66, 71 (CAl 1946) (citing Moore and
noting that "[i]t was not in the contemplation of Congress that the federal
bankruptcy power should be employed to pardon a bankrupt from the consequences of a criminal offense"); Z wick v. Freeman, 373 F. 2d 110, 116
(CA2 1967) (citing Moore and stating that "governmental sanctions are not
regarded as debts even when they require monetary payments"). We
have found only on~ federal court decision allowing a discharge under the
Act to affect a sentence imposed by a criminal court. In re Alderson, 98
F . 588 (W. Va. 1899).
8
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charge."
See lA Collier on Bankruptcy ~17.13, at
1609-1610, and n. 10 (14th ed. 1979).
Moreover, those few courts faced with restitution obligations imposed as part of criminal sentences applied the same
reasoning to prevent a discharge in bankruptcy from affecting such a condition of a criminal sentence. For instance,
four years before Congress enacted the Code, the New York
Supreme Court stated:
A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect whatsoever
upon a condition of restitution of a criminal sentence. A
bankruptcy proceeding is civil in nature and is intended
to relieve an honest and unfortunate debtor of his debts
and to permit him to begin his financial life anew. A
condition of restitution in a sentence of probation is a
part of the judgment of conviction. It does not create a
debt nor a debtor/creditor relationship between the persons making and receiving restitution. As with any
other condition of a probationary sentence it is intended
as a means to insure the defendant will lead a lawabiding life thereafter. State v. Mosesson, 78 Misc. 2d
217, 218, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 483, 484 (1974) (citations
omitted). 7
Thus, Congress enacted the Code in 1978 against the background of an established judicial exception to discharge for
criminal sentences, including restitution orders, an exception
created in the face of a statute drafted with considerable care
and specificity.
Just last Term we declined to hold that the new Bankruptcy Code silently abrogated another exception created by
courts construing the old Act. In Midlantic National Bank
v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474
U. S. - - (1986), a trustee in bankruptcy asked us to hold
7
For other decisions adopting this reasoning, see State ex rel . Auerbach
v. Topping Bros ., 79 Misc. 2d 260, 359 N. Y. S. 2d 985, 987-988 (Crim. Ct.
1974); State v. Washburn, 97 Cal. App. 3d 621, 625-626, 158 Cal. Rptr.
822, 825 (1979).
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that the 1978 Code had implicitly repealed an exception to the
trustee's abandonment power. Courts had created that exception out of deference to state health and safety regulations, a consideration comparable to the States' interests
implicated by this case. We stated:
The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation
of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. The Court has followed this rule with particular
care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications.
If Congress wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary
exemption from non-bankruptcy law, "the intention
would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or
inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in
administering the estate of the bankrupt." 474 U. S., at
- - (quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904)) (citations omitted).
B

Our interpretation of the Code also must reflect the basis
for this judicial exception, a deep conviction that federal
bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state
criminal proceedings. The right to formulate and enforce
penal sanctions is an important aspect of the sovereignty retained by the States. This Court has emphasized repeatedly
"the fundamental policy against federal interference with
state criminal prosecutions." Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S.
37, 46 (1971). The Court of Appeals nevertheless found support for its holding in the fact that Connecticut · officials
probably could have ensured continued enforcement of their
court's criminal judgment against Robinson had they objected to discharge under § 523(c). Although this may be
true in many cases, it hardly justifies an interpretation of the
1978 Act that is contrary to the long prevailing view that
"fines and penalties are not affected by a discharge," 1A
Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 17.13, at 1610 (14th ed. 1979).
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Moreover, reliance on a right to appear and object to discharge would create uncertainties and impose undue burdens
on state officials. In some cases it would require state prosecutors to defend particular state criminal judgments before
federal bankruptcy courts. 8 As JusTICE BRENNAN has
noted, federal adjudication of matters already at issue in
state criminal proceedings can be "an unwarranted and unseemly duplication of the State's own adjudicative process."
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 121 (1971) (opinion of BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 9
Also, as Robinson's attorney conceded at oral argument,
some restitution orders would not be protected from discharge even if the state did appear and enter an objection to
discharge. For example, a judge in a negligent homicide
case might sentence the defendant to probation, conditioned
on the defendant's paying the victim's husband compensation
for the loss the husband sustained when the defendant killed
his wife. It is not clear that such a restitution order would
fit the terms of any of the exceptions to discharge listed in
§ 523 other than § 523(a)(7). Thus, this interpretation of the
Code would do more than force state prosecutors to defend
state criminal judgments in federal bankruptcy court. In
8

In many cases, of course, principles of issue preclusion would obviate
the need for the bankruptcy court to reexamine factual questions, or interpret state law. But differences between the elements of crimes and the
provisions of § 523 frequently might hinder the application of issue preclusion. Moreover, apart from the burden on state officials of following and
participating in bankruptcy proceedings, it is unseemly to require state
prosecutors to submit the judgments of their criminal courts to federal
bankruptcy courts.
9
Of course, federal courts often duplicate state adjudicative processes
when they consider petitions for the writ of habeas corpus. But explicit
reference in the Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, as well as several federal
statutes, testify to the importance of the writ ofha.beas corpus. Here, the
case for relitigation in the federal courts rests only on the ambiguous words
of the Bankruptcy Code.
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some cases, it could lead to federal remission of judgments
imposed by state criminal judges.
This prospect, in turn, would hamper the flexibility of state
criminal judges in choosing the combination of imprisonment,
fines, and restitution most likely to further the rehabilitative
and deterrent goals of state criminal justice systems. 10 We
will not lightly limit the rehabilitative and deterrent options
available to state criminal judges.
In one of our cases interpreting the Act, Justice Douglas
remarked: "[W]e do not read these statutory words with the
ease of a computer. There is an overriding consideration
that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy
jurisdiction." Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U. S. 99, 103
(1966). This Court has recognized that the States' interest
in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable
types of relief. See Younger v. Harris, supra, at 44-45.
This reflection of our federalism also must influence our
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in this case. 11
Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the
defendant to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused.
Such a penalty will affect the defendant differently than a traditional fine,
paid to the State as an abstract and impersonal entity, and often calculated
without regard to the harm the defendant has caused. Similarly, the direct relation between the harm and the punishment gives restitution a
more precise deterrent effect than a traditional fine. See Note, Victim
Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 931, 937-941 (1984).
"Justice Frankfurter advocated a similar approach to the interpretation
of regulatory statutes that infringe upon important state interests:
The task is one of accommodation as between assertions of new federal authority and historic functions of the individual states. Federal legislation
of this character cannot therefore be construed without regard to the implications of our dual system of government. . . . The underlying assumptions
of our dual form of government, and the consequent presuppositions of legislative draftsmanship which are expressive of our history and habits, cut
across what might otherwise be the implied range of legislation. The his10
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III
In light of the established state of the law-that bankruptcy courts could not discharge criminal judgments-we
have serious doubts whether Congress intended to make
criminal penalties "debts" within the meaning of § 101(4). 12
But we need not address that question in this case, because
we hold that § 523(a)(7) preserves from discharge any condition a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal
sentence.
The relevant portion of § 523(a)(7) protects from discharge
any debt
to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit,
and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.
This language is subject to interpretation. On its face,
§ 523(a)(7) certainly does not compel the conclusion reached
by the Court of Appeals, that a discharge in bankruptcy voids
restitution orders imposed as conditions of probation by state
courts. Nowhere in the House and Senate Reports is there
any indication that this language should be read so intrusively. 13 If Congress had intended, by § 523(a)(7) or by any
tory of congressional legislation ... justif[ies] the generalization that,
when the Federal Government takes over such local radiations in the vast
network of our national economic enterprise and thereby radically readjusts the balance of state and national authority, those charged with the
duty of legislating are reasonably explicit. Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 539-540 (1947).
12
We recognize, as the Court of Appeals emphasized, that the Code's
definition of "debt" is broadly drafted, and that the legislative history supports a broad reading of the definition. But nothing in the legislative history of these sections suggests that Congress intended to change the state
of the law with respect to criminal judgments.
3
' For the section-by-section analysis in the legislative reports, see H. R.
Rep. No. 95-595, p. 363 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 79 (1978). For explanations of the section by commentators, see 3 Collier on Bankruptcy
H23.17 (15th ed. 1986); 1 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice §27.37
(1981). In fact, both of these commentators expressly state that the Ian-
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other provision, to discharge state criminal sentences, "we
can be certain that there would have been hearings, testimony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so
inimical to purposes previously deemed important, and so
likely to arouse public outrage," Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 209 (1978) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
Our reading of § 523(a)(7) differs from that of the Second
Circuit. On its face, it creates a broad exception for all penal
sanctions, whether they be denominated fines, penalties, or
forfeitures. Congress included two qualifying phrases; the
fines must be both "to and for the benefit of a governmental
unit," and "not compensation for pecuniary loss." Section
523(a)(7) protects traditional criminal fines; it codifies the
judicially created exception to discharge for fines. We must
decide whether the result is altered by the two major differences between restitution and a traditional fine. Unlike traditional fines , restitution is forwarded to the victim, and may
be calculated by reference to the amount of harm the offender
has caused.
guage does not have the intrusive effect sought by Robinson. See Collier,
~ 523.17, at 523-123 n. 4; Norton, § 27.37, at 55 n. 2.
It seems likely that the limitation of § 523(a)(7) to fines assessed "for the
benefit of a federal, state, or local government" was intended to prevent
application of that subsection to wholly private penalties such as punitive
damages. See House Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 2, pp. 116, 141 (1973). As for
the reference to "compensation for actual pecuniary loss," the Senate
Report indicates that the main purpose of this language was to prevent
§ 523(a)(7) from being applied to tax penalties. S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 79
(1978).
We acknowledge that a few comments in the hearings and the Bankruptcy Laws Commission Report may suggest that the language bears the
interpretation adopted by the Second Circuit. But none of those statements was made by a member of Congress, nor were they included in the
official Senate and House reports. We decline to accord any significance
to these statements. See McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S.
488, 493-494 (1931); 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction
§ 48.10, at 319, and n. 11 (rev. 4th ed. 1984).
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In our view, neither of the qualifying clauses of§ 523(a)(7)
allows the discharge of a criminal judgment that takes the
form of restitution. The criminal justice system is not operated primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of
society as a whole. Thus, it is concerned not only with punishing the offender, but also with rehabilitating him. Although restitution does resemble a judgment "for the benefit
of" the victim, the context in which it is imposed undermines
that conclusion. The victim has no control over the amount
of restitution awarded or over the decision to award restitution. Moreover, the decision to impose restitution generally
does not turn on the victim's injury, but on the penal goals of
the State and the situation of the defendant. As the bankruptcy judge in this case recognized, "Unlike an obligation
which arises out of a contractual, statutory or common law
duty, here the obligation is rooted in the traditional responsibility of a state to protect its citizens by enforcing its criminal statutes and to rehabilitate an offender by imposing a
criminal sanction intended for that purpose." 42 B. R., at
133.
This point is well illustrated by the Connecticut statute
under which the restitution obligation was imposed. The
statute authorizes a judge to impose any of eight specified
conditions of probation, as well as "any other conditions
reasonably related to his rehabilitation." Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 53a-30(a)(9). Clause (4) of that section authorizes a judge
to require that the defendant
make restitution of the fruits of his offense or make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a
suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby
and the court may fix the amount thereof and the manner of performance.
This clause does not require imposition of restitution in the
amount of the harm caused. Instead, it provides for a flexible remedy tailored to the defendant"s situation.
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Because criminal proceedings focus on the State's interests
in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim's desire for compensation, we conclude that restitution orders imposed in such proceedings operate "for the benefit of" the
State. Similarly, they are not assessed "for ... compensation" of the victim. The sentence following a criminal conviction necessarily considers the penal and rehabilitative interests of the state. 14 Those interests are sufficient to place
restitution orders within the meaning of § 523(a)(7).
In light of the strong interests of the States, the uniform
construction of the old Act over three-quarters of a century,
and the absence of any significant evidence that Congress intended to change the law in this area, we believe this result
best effectuates the will of Congress. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is
Reversed.

14
This is not the only context in which courts have been forced to evaluate the treatment of restitution orders by determining whether they are
"compensatory" or "penal." Several lower courts have addressed the constitutionality of the federal Victim Witness Protection Act, 18 U. S. C.
§ 3579. Under that Act, defendants have no right to jury trial as to the
amount of restitution, even though the Seventh Amendment would require
such a trial if the issue were decided in a civil case. See Note, The Right
to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982, 63 Texas L. Rev. 671 (1984). Every federal circuit
court that has considered the question has concluded that criminal defendants contesting the assessment of restitution orders are not entitled to the
protections of the Seventh Amendment. See id., at 672 n. 18 (citing
cases).
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted review in this case to decide whether restitution obligations, imposed as conditions of probation in state
criminal proceedings, are dischargeable in proceedings under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
I
In 1980, Carolyn Robinson pled guilty to larceny in the second degree. The charge was based on her wrongful receipt
of $9,932.95 in welfare benefits from the Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance. On November 14, 1980, the
Connecticut Superior Court sentenced Robinson to a prison
term of not less than one year nor more than three years.
The court suspended execution of the sentence and placed
Robinson on probation for five years. As a condition of probation, the judge ordered Robinson to make restitution 1 to
the State of Connecticut Office of Adult Probation (Probation
' Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 53a-30 sets out the conditions a trial court
may impose on a sentence of probation. Clause 4 of that section authorizes
a condition that the defendant
make restitution of the fruits of his offense or make restitution, in an
amount he can afford to pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or
damage caused thereby and the court may fix the amount thereof and the
manner of performance.
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Office) at the rate of $100 per month, commencing January
16, 1981, and continuing until the end of her probation. 2
On February 5, 1981, Robinson filed a voluntary petition
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 701 et
seq., in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Connecticut. That petition listed the restitution obligation as a debt. On February 20, 1981, the Bankruptcy Court
notified both the Connecticut agencies of Robinson's petition
and informe<f'- them that April 27, 1981, was the deadline for
filing objections to discharge. The agencies did not file
proofs of claim or objections to discharge, apparently because
they took the position that the bankruptcy would not affect
the conditions of Robinson's probation. Thus, the agencies
did not participate in the distribution of Robinson's estate.
On May 14, 1981, the bankruptcy court granted Robinson a
discharge. See § 727.
At the time Robinson received her discharge in bankruptcy, she had paid $450 in restitution. On May 20, 1981,
her attorney wrote the Probation Office that he believed the
discharge had altered the conditions of Robinson's probation,
voiding the condition that she pay restitution. Robinson
made no further payments.
The Connecticut Probation Office did not respond to this
letter until February 1984, when it informed Robinson that it
considered the obligation to pay restitution nondischargeable. Robinson responded by filing an adversary proceeding
in the Bankruptcy Court, seeking a declaration that the restitution obligation had been discharged , as well as an injunction to prevent the State'.s officials from forcing Robinson to
pay.
After a trial, the Bankruptcy Court entered a Memorandum and Proposed Order, concluding that the 1981 discharge
2
There is some uncertainty about the total ·amount Robinson was ordered to pay. Although the judge imposed restitution in a total amount of
$9,932.95, five years of payments at one hundred dollars a month total only
$6000.

